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ABSTRACT 
 West Papua in the easternmost area of Indonesia has long been recognized as one 
of its most controversial provinces. Since its integration into the Republic of Indonesia in 
1969, recurring controversy has colored many aspects of West Papuans’ everyday lives 
and the province’s relationship to the rest of Indonesia. The problems in West Papua are 
rooted to the way it was originally integrated, which, according to some scholars, is 
“unacceptable.” They argue that the Indonesian government manipulated the self-
determination process and its results. The government, however, has always denied this 
claim, noting in its legal argumentation, for instance, the involvement of the United 
Nations and the international community in the process of self-determination, known as 
“the Act of Free Choice.” Far from being resolved, the problems in West Papua have 
been exacerbated by the Indonesian government’s policies, which rely heavily on a strict 
security approach in an effort to suppress the secessionist movement. 
 As part of its attempt to address the problems comprehensively, the Indonesian 
government introduced a “special autonomy” bill for West Papua in late 2001. The bill, 
which was drafted mostly by indigenous West Papuans, passed the Indonesian parliament 
as Law No. 21 in November. Implementation of the law, however, has not worked as 
expected. Many of the law’s requirements either have not been implemented or have been 
only minimally implemented, even five years after the law’s promulgation. As a result, 
West Papuans have become increasingly skeptical and cynical about the government’s 
promises. Obviously, the Indonesian government must deal with and resolve the 
problems inherent in the implementation of the law’s requirements. This thesis addresses 
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A. THESIS BACKGROUND 
Indonesia consists of thirty-three provinces, one of which is Papua, or West 
Papua. The province was named Irian Jaya after its official integration into the Republic 
of Indonesia in 1969, but in 2001 the name was changed to Papua. To differentiate the 
province from the neighboring country of Papua New Guinea, this thesis will refer to the 
province as West Papua, as it is known internationally. 
 Like the rest of Indonesia, West Papua was colonized by the Netherlands. Yet 
when the Dutch granted independence to Indonesia in 1949, they retained sovereignty 
over Papua. For more than a decade, the newly independent government of Indonesia 
struggled diplomatically and militarily to win control over Papua. In the early 1960s, the 
Dutch agreed to cede control to the United Nations, which would transfer Papua to 
Indonesia after ascertaining Papuan support for union with Indonesia. In 1969, the 
Indonesian government, dominated by the military, conducted an “Act of Free Choice” in 
which government-selected Papuans “chose” to join Indonesia. This process gave rise to 
a group of unsatisfied Papuans, and their dissatisfaction was then transformed into a 
secessionist movement led by the Free Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua 
Merdeka/OPM). 
The Indonesian government’s response to the problem in West Papua not only 
exacerbated the problem, but also triggered another problem. During the authoritarian 
New Order regime (1968–1997), a security approach dominated the government’s 
policies in West Papua. This policy undermined government policies in other sectors and 
eventually increased the resentment among Papuans. After the downfall of the New 
Order regime and the start of the so-called Reform Era in 2001, the Indonesian 
government finally launched a Special Autonomy Law for West Papua, the well-known 
Law No. 21/2001. Actually, the Law was a response to demands from West Papuans, 
other Indonesians, and the international community for a solution to the problems in the 
province. Unfortunately, as this thesis will argue, the implementation of special 
autonomy in West Papua did not go as planned and inevitably created even more 




Figure 1: Map of Indonesia (From:www.depdiknas.go.id. accessed on 10/17/2006 
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B. PURPOSE AND ARGUMENTS 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the implementation of the special 
autonomy policy in the Indonesian province of West Papua. When it was signed in 2001, 
many people expected the policy to provide a comprehensive solution to the province’s 
long-running secession problem. The government of Indonesia as well as many West 
Papuans put a lot of hope in this policy that so far has disappointed them. In fact, it has 
created more skepticism among West Papuans, politicians, scholars, Indonesians, and the 
international community. This thesis seeks to explain this outcome and assess the 
implications for the future of the Papuan separatist movement and Indonesian national 
unity. 
2. Importance 
The issue of West Papua’s possible secession has long been a source of friction in 
the government of Indonesia’s quest for international relationships with other countries. 
The problem is rooted in the process through which the Netherlands transferred 
sovereignty over its colony in Papua to Indonesia in the 1960s. Under the terms of an 
3 
agreement among Indonesia, the Netherlands, and the United Nations, Indonesia’s 
control over the territory was contingent upon the outcome of a referendum in West 
Papua. In 1969, Indonesia conducted a so-called “Act of Free Choice” among about 
1,200 handpicked West Papuans; the United Nations chose only to “note,” rather than 
accept or reject, their unanimous decision to become part of Indonesia. Since the fall of 
Indonesia’s authoritarian New Order regime in 1998, many West Papuans and members 
of the international community have argued that the problem should be  discussed again 
using a new format and in new circumstances. Although no country officially recognizes 
or supports the existence of the secessionist movement in West Papua, local support for 
independence has not declined, even after the introduction of the special autonomy law in 
2001. This concerns Indonesia’s national government, which believes it cannot afford 
any territorial losses like the case of East Timor again. Any similar incidents, it fears, will 
trigger similar demands from the other Indonesian regions and raise the prospect of 
national disintegration, which, sadly, has become a common concern since the 1997 
crisis. This is the main fear of most Indonesians, who think that the cost of further 
disintegration would be too high for either Indonesia or the international community to 
bear. 
3. Major Debates About and/or Approaches to the Issue 
The decision by the government of Indonesia to introduce special autonomy as 
one of the latest policies for approaching the West Papua problem has not yielded the 
results expected. Some scholars, international as well as Indonesian, see this policy as 
merely a temporary reaction by the government, rather than of a comprehensive policy. 
Special autonomy has been skeptically described as another “good promise” for West 
Papuans, implemented just to ease the demands of the secessionists.  
Unfortunately, what has happened in West Papua since 2001 when the law was 
launched confirms that assessment. As a result, many West Papuans believe that the 
government is not genuinely willing to solve the problem and will simply continue its old 
approach. But even though scholars do not really believe in the political will of the 




problems in West Papua. It undeniably accommodates most of the demands of the 
secessionists. Independence, however, according to the government, is definitely not 
negotiable. 
4. Major Questions and Arguments  
Why did the implementation of special autonomy in West Papua during the period 
2001–2006 fail? How has it failed? Why has there been no significant improvement in 
the West Papuan situation? The same old problems in terms of economy, politics, society, 
still remain. In addition, justice and human rights conditions have shown little 
improvement. Unfortunately, the central issue here is much more complicated than just a 
demand for independence. The introduction of special autonomy, basically, could provide 
a good opportunity for the Indonesian government, as well as West Papuans, to find a 
comprehensive, reasonable, and acceptable solution to the problems in this province. 
Both sides, however, continue to stand in the way of the necessary compromise.  
C. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Over the past several years, West Papua has been a popular topic for scholars, 
politicians, students, NGOs, and many others, appearing frequently in their research, 
discussions, presentations, seminars, and debates. All look at West Papua as an area 
where the struggle for independence is a reality within the day-to-day international 
political context. This reality is directly related to the policies that the Indonesian 
government imposes in West Papua, which, according to some, undermines West 
Papuans’ right to determine their own future. In fact, since its integration into the 
Republic of Indonesia in 1969, West Papua has continuously created controversy both 
domestically and internationally. 
  Opinion regarding special autonomy in West Papua falls into one of three 
categories: proponents, opponents, and skeptics. Though not entirely convincing, the 
view that special autonomy is the only reasonable solution for West Papua does make a 
certain sense, since both sides–the Indonesian government and the secessionists – stand at 
very different points.  
The Indonesian government believed that a special autonomy policy was the best 
solution for solving the main problems in West Papua. And it was adopted as law by the 
Indonesian House of Representative (DPR/Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) in October 2001. 
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The law’s implementation was to begin with a commitment by the central government to 
give special autonomy to West Papua according to the broad outline established in 1999 
by the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR), the country’s highest constitutional body 
at the time, .  
In his book, West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy, 
or Chaos, an Australian specialist, Peter King argues that the idea of autonomy in 
Indonesia emerged in 1998 in the wake of the Reformation Era. Since then, there has 
been intense debate within Indonesia about finding alternative solutions, to reduce the 
power of the central government as it existed during the New Order Era. Three 
alternative ideas – autonomy, federalism, and independence – circulated among 
politicians and scholars. However, independence and federalism were soon ruled out 
because of previous bad experiences, particularly the case of East Timor. This left 
autonomy as the only politically acceptable choice.  
As a result, autonomy, either regional or special, was implemented throughout 
Indonesia, including in West Papua and Aceh. Special autonomy in West Papua, 
however, as King describes, was far from the original draft composed by West Papuan’s 
intellectuals.1  Therefore, according to King, while it embraced most of the West 
Papuan’s demands, the Indonesian government managed to eliminate any reference to the 
people’s implicit desire for “independence,” as mentioned in the bill’s first draft.2 
Similarly, Richard Chauvel, an expert of Indonesian history and politics from 
Victoria University in Australia, and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, head of the political studies 
center at the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (LIPI—Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan 
Indonesia) perceive special autonomy as a “controversial” policy that originated during 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency, when it was widely seen as just another element in the 
“political chaos” that characterized his presidency, because of the president’s inconsistent 
policies about almost everything. The notion of special autonomy for West Papua 
resulted in overwhelming objections from some elements of the Indonesian government,  
 
                                                 
1 Peter King, West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy, or Chaos, Sidney: 
University of New South Wales Press, Ltd., 2004,  68–84. 
2 Ibid.,  85. 
6 
especially considering the fact that the bill, which already gave greater concessions to 
West Papuans, also strongly expressed West Papuans’ nationalist sentiments and 
aspirations.  
In fact, as Chauvel and Bhakti point out, the decision to give West Papuans the 
opportunity to draft their own version of the special autonomy bill actually came from the 
lack of “clarity and substance” in the government of Indonesia’s commitment to this 
matter which, since 1999, has been only rhetorical. The contribution of West Papuan 
elements to the bill gave it more legitimacy.3 Unfortunately, in Jakarta’s opinion, the 
West Papuans were also skeptical in their perception of special autonomy: “Why should 
we believe Jakarta now?”4 
The law on special autonomy, which consists of twenty-seven chapters and 
seventy-nine articles, accommodates most of the West Papuans’ principles and important 
interests. Sullivan, a British expert in regional autonomy, underlines the fact that special 
autonomy for West Papua, Law No.21/2001, is divided into four major categories, or 
principles: greater authority for the local government; recognition and respect for the 
basic rights of the indigenous West Papuans; accommodation of broader participation by 
the indigenous West Papuans in good governance, transparency, and accountability; 
protection and enforcement of human rights, with no exceptions or discrimination, based 
on equality.5 Though different from the original draft, the law on special autonomy 
passed by the Indonesian House of Representatives in September 2001 included an article 
specifying that a native West Papuan be the governor of that region.  
Equally important, according to Rodd McGibbon, an Australian political scientist 
and Indonesia observer, special autonomy is meant to accommodate a demand of the 
people in West Papua that they have a broader opportunity to rule their own region. 
McGibbon, however, also notes that special autonomy in West Papua, like the notion of 
autonomy in other countries, basically emerged from the central government’s fear of the 
                                                 
3 Richard Chauvel and  Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, The Papua Conflict: Jakarta’s Perceptions and Policies, 
Washington, DC.: East-West Center, 2004, 31–33. 
4 Ibid., 33. 
5 Laurence Sullivan. Challenges to Special autonomy in the Province of Papua, Republic of Indonesia. 
The Australian National University. Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies. Jun, 2003. 3-7  
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growing demand for independence.6 In the case of Indonesia, in the wave of demands for 
democratization, autonomy was seen as a reasonable and acceptable choice, which 
significantly weakened the power of the central government. Furthermore, McGibbon 
argues, despite a number of controversies following the implementation of special 
autonomy, the law also imposed some articles that were seen as a great economic 
incentive for West Papuans. Basically, they required the central government to return to 
the province eighty percent of the national tax revenue collected from general mining in 
the province, and seventy percent of the revenue from oil and natural gas produced in the 
province.. Nonetheless, implementation of the law remains a big question.7 
Finally, according to Jacques Bertrand, a Canadian expert on politics and ethnic 
conflict in Indonesia, if the special autonomy law could be applied sincerely in West 
Papua, the problem that the government of Indonesia faces would gradually solve itself.8 
Unfortunately, this has not happened. As many West Papuans argue, the implementation 
of special autonomy is not as they expected. Violence still occurs, as was evidenced by 
the assassination of Theys Eluay, chairman of the peaceful opposition group Presidium of 
West Papua, in November 2001, by the Indonesian military. Moreover, a lack of 
economic and fiscal tranparency continues, and there is no sign that it will end soon. The 
allocation of revenue is still not as stated in the law, and the continuing security approach 
by the central government causes more frustration among West Papuans and results in 
more discontent.9 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES. 
1. Methodology  
The method used in this thesis to comprehensively study special autonomy in 
West Papua is a process-tracing method. This method allowed us to analyze in depth the 
core of the problem regarding the implementation of special autonomy in West Papua. By  
 
                                                 
6 Rodd McGibbon,. Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special autonomy the Solution? 
Washington, D.C.: Policy Studies, East-West Center, 2003, 1–4. 
7 Ibid., 34–38. 
8 Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, 185-210 
9 Ibid., 185-210 
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using close and careful observation, the thesis aimed at determining what was missing in 
the case. And it enabled us to better understand the application of special autonomy in 
West Papua. 
Additionally, by tracing the historical events that occurred in West Papua both 
prior to and after special autonomy was launched, the thesis would be able to track the 
development of the Indonesian government’s policies. The policies are, as this thesis 
argues, evidence showing why special autonomy has failed. The process-tracing 
combined with descriptive-analytical method will also identify several important 
intervening variables that are useful in determining the dependent variable—the West 
Papuans’ desire for secession. This method also should help reveal many of the causal 
mechanisms that lead to popular support for secession in West Papua.  
2. Sources 
The thesis draws on a number of primary and secondary sources. On the basis of 
that research, this thesis focuses on the current debate among scholars regarding the 
issues of West Papua, particularly the historical perspective and theoretical background. 
The primary sources that relate especially to the implementation of special autonomy in 
West Papua are presented as evidence in the assessment of the degree to which the policy 
has been implemented on the ground. The thesis also provides statistical data to 
strengthen these arguments. In combination, the research drawn from all the sources 
should yield a comprehensive picture of the overall situation in West Papua during the 
period of special autonomy, 2001–2006. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis provides substantial arguments regarding the failure of Special 
Autonomy in West Papua. The indicators of failure are presented as evidence in an 
attempt to measure the degree of implementation of Special Autonomy during the period 
2001–2005. In addition, the thesis also provides a number of policy recommendations for 
both the government of Indonesia and the authorities in West Papua regarding the 
implementation process of the Special Autonomy Law. Finally, in its presentation of the 
facts and data in this field of study, the thesis will hopefully be useful for the Indonesian 
government in reshaping its policies toward West Papua, especially bearing in mind the  
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situation in Aceh, another conflict region, which was once worse than West Papua, but 
which gradually normalized after the signing of the Aceh Memorandum of 
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DISPUTE IN WEST 
PAPUA 
I give this command positively and clearly. Defeat this "state of Papua"! 
Unfurl the Red and White Flag in West Irian! Defeat it! Unfurl our flag! 
Be prepared, general mobilization is coming! General mobilization which 
will involve the whole of the people of Indonesia in order to liberate West 
Irian completely from the stranglehold of Dutch imperialism… 




                 
Figure 2: Map of West Papua (From:www.komodotours.com, accessed on 
10/17/2006. available at <http://komodotours.com/images/papua-map.jpg>) 
 
 
                                                 
10 Sukarno, Jogjakarta, 19 December 1961 ; Speech in front mass meeting in Jogjakarta. accessed on 
10/27/2006. available at (http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/pidato/1961-12-jogjakarta.html) 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
West Papua, Indonesia’s easternmost province has long been a source of political 
controversy for Indonesia. As a Dutch colony, West Papua was in the same situation as 
other parts of Indonesia. However, in West Papua, there was no strong resistance to 
Dutch colonial rule. Until it broke up during the period 1950–1960, the situation in West 
Papua under Dutch control was relatively calm. Indonesia’s gain of independence in 
1945, followed by three years of war, heavily influenced the situation in West Papua. 
After the 1949 Round Table Agreement, which officially ended Dutch occupation over 
the rest of its colony, the Indonesian government tried tirelessly to convince the Dutch 
that West Papua, according to the Round Table Agreement, was part of Indonesia. 
Unfortunately, the two countries’ disagreement about the future of West Papua ultimately 
created a now thirty-five-year-old secessionist movement in West Papua. 
B. WEST PAPUA BEFORE DUTCH COLONIZATION 
1. West Papua in Early Indonesian History 
The history of West Papua can be traced back to the twelfth century, the era of the 
kingdom of Sriwijaya in South Sumatra and the kingdom of Majapahit (1292–1521) in 
East Java. During this period, West Papua, then called Djanggi, was under the 
protectorate of Majapahit.11 After the fall of Majapahit and the rise of Islamic kingdoms 
and sultanates, West Papua was ruled by the Tidore sultanate and was part of the trade 
and slavery expeditions from other kingdoms, such as the kingdom of Gowa in South 
Sulawesi and the Ternate sultanate in Moluccas. In addition, the people in West Papua 
were obliged to pay tribute to the Sultan of Tidore as one of the sultan’s protectorates.12  
2. The Presence of Colonial Powers 
West Papua existed in relative calm until the early 1500s, when the Portuguese 
began their colonial expeditions, eventually landing in Moluccas and Malacca. In 
addition to trading, the Portuguese also tried to annex some of the territories in the 
region. This effort, which was quite successful, was marked by the fall of Malacca and 
Moluccas. As for West Papua, either the Portuguese Jorge de Meneses or the Spaniard 
                                                 
11 Makarim Wibisono, The Restoration of Irian Jaya into the Republic of Indonesia. New York 200, 5. 
Available at http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/Publications/IRJAbook/Irja RightFrame.htm 
(accessed on 8/11/2005). 
12 Peter King. West Papua and Indonesia since Suharto: Independence, Autonomy, or Chaos. Sidney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2004, 19. 
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Alvaro de S. Ceron is believed to be the first European to visit West Papua, in 1527.13 On 
June 13, 1545, a Spaniard, Ynigo Ortiz de Retez, named the island “Nueva Guinea,” 
because he found that its people were similar to the people of Guinea, a Spanish 
possession on the west coast of Africa.14 However, a Portuguese sailor had earlier 
referred to this big island as “Ilha de Papoia,” and it was well known as West Papua.15 
C.  WEST PAPUA UNDER THE DUTCH COLONIZATION  
During the period 1602–1799, under the banner of the Vereenigde Oostindische 
Compagnie (VOC), the Dutch established their power in the territory that is today’s 
Indonesia. The Dutch had an agreement with local authorities, including with the Sultan 
of Tidore, who exercised his authority on Moluccas and the surrounding areas to secure 
the Dutch trading routes and harbors from piracies and from Spain’s and England’s 
interests.16 
The Dutch officially proclaimed the west part of New Guinea as their territory on 
August 24, 1828, and continued by settling their representatives in Merkusoord, Fakfak, 
and Manokwari.17 They also furthered their authority in West New Guinea, in response to 
British and German activities in the east part of the island, by significantly increasing 
their administration. Manokwari, Fakfak, and Merauke were the first three regions 
developed by the Dutch to function as administrative cities.  
Prior to the Second World War, the Dutch East Indies’ administration in the 
Moluccas province was divided into two residencies (administrative divisions), Ambon 
and Ternate, of which West Papua was a part.18 After an uprising in Java, in the early 
years of the Indonesian political movement, which began in 1927, the Dutch also used the 
island as a place of exile for some of Indonesia’s communist members.19 The Dutch 
                                                 
13 Peter Van der heijden. History of Netherland’s New Guinea, March 1, 2005, p 1. Available at 
(http://www.vanderheijden.org/ng/history.html)  accessed on 8/11/2005. 
14 Ibid., 1 
15 Wibisono, Ibid., 5. 
16.Ibid., 2. 
17 Ibid.  2 
18 Wibisono. Ibid., 6. 
19 Ibid., 2. 
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managed to stay in this region until the beginning of Pacific War in 1942, when the 
Japanese started to take control of Indonesia, including West Papua. 
D.  THE ORIGIN OF THE INDONESIAN-DUTCH DISPUTE OVER WEST 
PAPUA 
1.  The Period 1945–1949 
Indonesia was occupied by the Dutch for almost three hundred and fifty years, 
beginning with its presence in 1600 and lasting until 1942. After three years of 
occupation by Japan, in 1945 the Dutch tried to reoccupy Indonesia, using the momentum 
created by Japan’s defeat by the Allies. On August 17, 1945, Indonesia, however, was 
proclaimed an independent state by Indonesia’s first president and vice president, 
Sukarno and Hatta. Dutch intentions clashed with Indonesia’s passions to be independent, 
resulting in three years of war throughout the country. After a painful struggle, both 
militarily and diplomatically, Indonesia’s independence was finally recognized by the 
international community in the Round Table agreement in December 1949 in Den Haag, 
Netherlands. Another important result of the Round Table Conference was an agreement 
between the two governments, through bilateral negotiations, to transfer authority and 
sovereignty over West Papua to Indonesia within one year.20  
2.  The Period 1950–1960 
However, until the beginning of 1950, bilateral negotiations between the countries 
failed to solve the problem. Instead, conflict between them was intensified by the Dutch 
government’s decision to formally establish a permanent colonial administration for West 
Papua.21 The period 1950–1960 was marked by several bilateral meetings between the 
two countries’ officials in an effort to settle the problem peacefully. Notably, there were 
at least three official conferences that focused on solving the dispute over West Papua. 
The first conference, in April 1950, was followed by a second conference in December 
1950, and a third a year later, in December 1951.22 All the conferences failed, because the  
 
 
                                                 
20 William Henderson , West New Guinea: The Dispute and Its Settlement. Seton Hall University 
Press, 1973, 20-23. 
21 Ibid., 23. 
22 Wibisono, Ibid., 12. 
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Dutch wanted to maintain their presence in West Papua, something that the Indonesian 
government saw as virtually a continuation of Dutch colonial rule over Indonesian 
territory. 
After seeing the Dutch position regarding this matter, the Indonesian government 
decided to bring the problem to the United Nations, where it was formally addressed by 
the UN General Assembly in its ninth session, in 1954.23 Unfortunately, no resolution 
was issued regarding this matter. In the meantime, the domestic political situation in 
Indonesia was colored overwhelmingly by anti-Dutch sentiment, which was fueled by a 
Dutch decision in 1960 to send an aircraft carrier into West Papuan waters. The 
Indonesian government responded critically to this development and eventually launched 
the Mandala military operation, with its famous rhetoric of the so-called People’s Three 
Commands: to thwart the formation of a puppet state of West Papua by a colonial power; 
to raise the Indonesian red and white flag in West Papua; and to prepare a general 
mobilization to defend national independence and unity.24 Relations between the two 
countries sharply deteriorated, especially after limited armed conflicts occurred both in 
West Papuan waters and on land. It seemed that, at this point, military confrontation 
between the two countries was inevitable.  
At the same time, the international community, most notably the United Nations, 
the United States, Australia, and some of the non-aligned countries, urged both countries 
to settle the dispute diplomatically and peacefully. Equally important was the Cold War 
situation, which triggered fear in Washington regarding the future of Indonesia, 
especially considering the existence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the largest 
communist party outside the USSR and China. During this period, Indonesia had very 
close relations with the USSR, something the United States tried to disrupt. Therefore it 
was important for the United States to approach West Papua’s problem diplomatically, 
instead of causing a military confrontation between the Dutch and Indonesia, which had 
                                                 
 23 Makarim Wibisono, The Restoration of Irian Jaya into the Republic of Indonesia. New York 200, 
13. Available at http://www.indonesiamission-ny.org/issuebaru/Publications/IRJAbook/Irja 
RightFrame.htm (accessed on 8/11/2005). 
24 Wibisono.  Ibid., 13 
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the Soviet Union as its back-up.25 As a result, in August 1962, the Dutch and Indonesia, 
under UN supervision, signed the New York Agreement, by which the two countries 
agreed to transfer the administration of West Papua from the Netherlands to a United 
Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). The period for the UNTEA would be 
from 1 October 1962 to 1 May 1963, followed by Indonesian control, with the agreement 
that an Act of Free Choice would be held within five years.26 
3.  The 1969 Act of Free Choice 
The controversial Act of Free Choice, a sort of referendum which was held in 
August 1969, marked the official integration of West Papua into the Republic of 
Indonesia. This Act, as was noted above, was the continuation of the 1962 New York 
Agreement, which was basically meant to fulfill the genuine aspiration of the people of 
West Papua.27 However, because of the way the referendum was conducted, the Act of 
Free Choice was widely criticized. This was the case despite the fact that it was held 
under UN supervision and close oversight by international representatives, most notably 
from the United States and Australia. 
The controversy over the Act of Free Choice is understandable, especially 
considering the fact that only 1,026 West Papuans – mostly tribal leaders, customary 
chiefs, and village chiefs – were chosen to represent a West Papua population of almost 
800,000 at that time. Equally important was the fact that, according to John Saltford, 
those 1,026 West Papuans voted under Indonesian military coercion. Therefore, instead 
of having an Act of Free Choice, the people in West Papua had an “Act of No Choice.”28 
On the other hand, according to Andri Hadi, the Indonesian government had no other 




                                                 
25 Jim Elmslie . Irian Jaya Under the Gun: Indonesian Economic Development versus West Papua 
Nationalism, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2002, 12. 
26 Elmslie. Ibid., 12 
27 Wibisono, Ibid., 25. 
28 John Saltford, West Papua 35 Years On: Time to Hear the Truth, London, August 2004, 1–3. 
available at (http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archieves/archievesdet2.asp?FileID=20040810.E02)  accessed 
on 10/29/2005. 
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circumstances faced by the Indonesian government, especially in terms of 
communication, transportation, the language barrier, illiteracy, and backwardness.29 Hadi 
also argues,  
It is also to be bore in mind that UN general Assembly Resolution 1514 
(1960) concerning the right of decolonization did not mandate the 
application of the “one-man one-vote” system as the only way for 
decolonization process. Most importantly, the resolution underlined that 
self-determination shall not result in a partial or total destruction of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the successor state.30 
He elaborates further that many states, especially in Africa, followed the same path as 
West Papua. As he points out, 
… many new states in Africa came into being in the 1960s without 
resorting to a plebiscite or “one-man one-vote system.” In our immediate 
region, Sabah and Sarawak were also incorporated into Malaysia in 1963 
without a direct “one-man one-vote” plebiscite, but by certification of a 
visiting UN mission.31 
In light of this debate, it is not surprising that many people believe that the Act of 
Free Choice with all its controversies was the main source of the problem in West Papua. 
The controversial way it was held contributed much to the next development in this 
problematic situation. Many elements, both domestic and international, used the very 
critical momentum of the West Papua problem as the basis of their arguments to 
determine the next step in solving the problem. The Indonesian government, 
unfortunately, reacted temperamentally in facing the challenges of its policies in West 
Papua. A heavy-handed security approach, with an emphasis on a military anti-guerilla 
operation, was the Indonesian government’s main choice for addressing the problem in 
West Papua. As a result, instead of cooling things down, the problem was worsened and 
exacerbated. 
                                                 
29 Andri Hadi, Papuans Need Democracy, Not Separatism, Jakarta, July 2004, 1. available at 
(http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archieves/archievesdet2.asp?FileID=20040730.E02) accessed on 
10/29/2005. 
30 Andri Hadi, Papuans Need Democracy, Not Separatism, Jakarta, July 2004, 1. available at 
(http://www.thejakartapost.com/Archieves/archievesdet2.asp?FileID=20040730.E02) accessed on 
10/29/2005. 2 
31 Ibid., 2 
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Figure 3: Transfer of Sovereignty in 1969 (From: www.indonesiamission-ny.org. 
accessed on 10/17/2006. available at <http://www.indonesiamission-
ny.org/issuebaru/Publications/IRJAbook/IrjaFrameSet.htm>) 
 
4. The Free West Papua Organization (Organisasi Papua 
Merdeka/OPM) 
One of the main actors in West Papua is the Free West Papua Organization, better 
known as the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka). The organization was founded in July 
1964 by Ferry Permenas Awom in an attempt to challenge Indonesian authority in West 
Papua. Its founding followed an event on 1 December 1961, in which a number of West 
Papuan leaders declared West Papua’s independence, though it was still under Dutch 
rule. This maneuver was viewed by the Indonesian government as a Dutch strategy to 
keep the territory under its rule. In addition, despite the fact that the Indonesian 
government had officially assumed authority in West Papua in 1969, marked by the 
ratification of the Act of Free Choice, on 1 July 1971, the OPM announced from its 
jungle headquarters that West Papua was a sovereign republic. This was followed by their 
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announcement of a West Papua interim government, including its cabinet.32 The 
Indonesian government was naturally irritated by this development and quickly launched 
a military operation to crush the organization. 
During the 1980s, there were a number of limited armed conflicts between the 
OPM and the Indonesian Armed Forces which resulted in fatalities on both sides, as well 
as to civilians. The Indonesian government was overwhelmed during this period by 
separatist movements in three trouble-spots: Aceh, East Timor, and West Papua. At the 
same time, the Suharto government needed stability in order to continue its development 
program. Therefore, the regime quickly chose a security approach in addressing all these 
separatist problems, which eventually had a boomerang effect on the Indonesian 
government. In this period, there were only three incidents, however, that could be 
categorized as significant in keeping the OPM on the stage of separatism in West Papua. 
These were an OPM kidnapping of fifty lumber company employees, an attack on 
prisoners in Jayapura, and the signing of the Port Villa declaration meant as preparation 
for a National Congress.33 
Basically, the OPM has never seriously challenged the Indonesian government. Its 
military ability is heavily reliant on guerilla-style operations, with surprise attacks or 
ambushes as its main tactics. Also, the OPM is believed to have less than a thousand 
active members with about a hundred mixed weapons, including traditional weapons such 
as machetes and bows and arrows.34 But according to Elmslie, “This still leaves 
unanswered the question of how many OPM fighters there are. In turn, this question begs 
another: ‘What is an OPM fighter?’ If a man is living in one of the ‘quiet’ areas, not 
engaging in armed attacks, is he of the OPM?”35  
Nonetheless, the OPM has a good strategy for achieving its goals, using the 
political struggle as its main agenda, especially through the use of the Internet to shape 
the international community’s opinion regarding the problem in West Papua. Therefore, 
                                                 
32 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, Organisasi Papua Merdeka, 2005,. 1–8. available at 
(http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?t=Q&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwi)  accessed on 
10/11/2005. 
33 Jane’s. Ibid., 6. 
34 Jane’s. Ibid., 4 
35 Elmslie. Ibid., 55. 
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even though the OPM is considered meaningless militarily, its political front has made a 
significant contribution to the internationalization of West Papua’s problem.36 And the 
Indonesian government seems unable to counter the OPM diplomatically, especially 
given the continuation of other problems in West Papua that exacerbate an already 
difficult situation for the Indonesian government. 
E.  WEST PAPUA DURING THE NEW ORDER ERA 
1. A History of the New Order and West Papua 
The New Order Era was marked by the rise of Suharto, Indonesia’s second 
president, in late 1968, following the political turmoil in September 1965 caused by an 
abortive coup by the Indonesian Communist Party. After his official assumption of 
power, Suharto quickly stabilized all potential challenges to his authority, including that 
of West Papua. As mentioned above, the controversial Act of Free Choice was held in 
August 1969. However, long before that, in 1962, Suharto was commander in chief of an 
Indonesian military operation, known as Operation Mandala, to liberate West Papua from 
Dutch colonization. Suharto was responsible directly to the President regarding all 
aspects of the operation which explicitly gave zero tolerance to failure. Militarily, the 
operation was quite successful, marked by a Dutch decision to accept negotiations and 
their eventual recognition of Indonesian authority over West Papua. Unfortunately, some 
of the side effects of that operation created another problem which then transformed into 
resistance from West Papuans. 
2. Suharto and His Policies in West Papua 
Under the Suharto regime, West Papua emerged as one of the most potentially 
rich regions in Indonesia, especially after the Freeport McMoRan Company – a copper 
and gold mining company – began operating in Timika, West Papua. The other natural 
resource in West Papua which significantly changed the political and economic landscape 
were its forests, which, like copper and gold, emerged as one of West Papua’s most 
important industries. Since then, West Papua has been associated with these two 
industries: mining and forestry. Suharto’s regime understood the resource potential very 
well and realized its many advantages. Unfortunately, the way it explored the region, like  
                                                 
36 Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, Organisasi Papua Merdeka, 2005, 5  available at 
(http://www4.janes.com/K2/doc.jsp?t=Q&K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwit/jwi)  accessed on 
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the way it integrated West Papua into Indonesia, has had unanticipated side effects 
which, given the original West Papuan resentment, created even greater resistance to the 
Indonesian government. 
In the Suharto era, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, economic development was 
the government’s primary focus. Suharto believed that a prosperous Indonesia would not 
be achievable without economic development. Therefore, the government tried to create 
as many opportunities for investment as possible in every part of Indonesia, including in 
West Papua. Simultaneously, the government also tried to create a balance in the 
population in some parts of Indonesia. This was necessary, especially, because of the 
high density of the population on Java Island, while some areas, like West Papua, had a 
very small share of the population. As a result, transmigration – basically, a transfer of 
people from Java to West Papua and some other islands in Indonesia – seemed a viable 
option to solve the problem. This program, however, like other government policies, had 
unintended negative implications. The transmigration process deviated from its original 
purpose – to spread and boost development – into a process of marginalization of the 
indigenous West Papuans.  
Furthermore, according to Elmslie, the real intention of transmigration was related 
to the government’s security concerns. Transmigration was intended to stabilize a region 
threatened by secession – mostly by the indigenous West Papuans – that would be 
changed by the incoming Javanese.37 Elmslie also notes that the government’s policy of 
transmigration was soon followed by a spontaneous migration of other Indonesians, most 
notably from Java and South Sulawesi. This then exacerbated the relations between the 
indigenous West Papuans and the immigrants, creating clashes between them, which 
resulted in several deaths.38 The number of immigrants who moved to West Papua varied; 
some sources believe that as many as 800,000 immigrants have settled in West Papua.39 
In some parts of West Papua, the number is relatively high, due to the fact that the 
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immigrants live in areas with a greater economic potential. As a result, the West Papuans 
were marginalized – economically, socially, and, ultimately, politically. 
Economically, under Suharto’s regime West Papua improved. But the 
improvement was relatively lower than the improvement in other parts of Indonesia. This 
fact appears contradictory, given the presence of the Freeport Company in the region, 
undeniably one of the biggest copper and gold mining companies in the world. In the year 
2004 alone, the Freeport Company had revenues of $1,746.6 million from the production 
of copper and gold.40 Paradoxically, in the year 2005, almost 30 percent of West Papua’s 
population lived beneath the poverty level.41 In light of these facts, the biggest question 
that emerges is: Where did all that money go? The answer is, obviously not to the West 
Papuans. The Freeport Company, however, did contribute to the “development” in the 
region. According to Freeport, it has spent $180 million since 1990 on social programs, 
including infrastructure development such as roads, health facilities, housing, and clean 
water suppliers.42 But even more fascinating is the amount of money that the company 
paid to the Suharto regime, which was made to look like a purely business transaction 
between Freeport and some Suharto-linked companies. During the period 1991–1997, the 
company made a $673 million loan to Suharto-linked interests. In March 2004, the 
company spent $253.4 million to repay one such loan.43 At this point, it is clear that, 
despite its huge benefits, the Freeport Company has served only the interests of the 
Suharto regime and its cronies. The West Papuans who owned the land were left behind 
in all their continued backwardness. 
3.  The New Order and Its Security Approach 
One of the most important factors affecting the current situation in West Papua is 
the New Order regime’s decision to rely on a heavy-handed security approach in dealing 
with the problems in West Papua. Since the beginning of West Papua’s integration into 
Indonesia in 1963, the Indonesian government has applied security measures for every 
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development and political dynamic in the region. As a result, the Indonesian government,  
and, most notably, the Indonesian army, has made many blunders, which have created not 
only a backlash to the government’s policies, but also heavy resistance from the West 
Papuans.    
According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report, the Indonesian 
government’s policy on West Papua is a source of growing resentment in this region.44 
Furthermore, “The New Order Government’s response to West Papuan demands for 
independence and use of a national symbol has been one of suppression and detention or 
elimination of those involved. This approach was still evident after the fall of Suharto.”45 
During the New Order Era, there were several incidents in which the security 
approach was the main and only choice of the Indonesian government, especially when it 
was dealing with demonstrations, riots, and armed attacks. Some of the most obvious 
incidents were cases of OPM flag-raisings, which happened “regularly.” But the 
Indonesian government’s response does not seem to change at all. Unfortunately, these 
types of incidents have the potential for unintended side effects, such as human rights 
violations, due to the fact that the authorities always act unproportionally in responding. 
What is more unfortunate, the Indonesian Army and Police are the two institutions that 
are most likely to commit this violation. This was the case in the incidents that occurred 
in Wasior on 13 June 2001. Five Brimob (Indonesian Paramilitary Police Unit) members 
were killed in an attack by a group of armed men believed to be members of OPM. 
According to the ICG report, “After the raid, Brimob descended on nearby villages and 
took brutal and indiscriminate revenge on civilians … twelve West Papuans were killed 
and another 26 are missing, though some of the latter may be alive.”46 Another example 
is the killing of Theys Eluay, a chairman of the West Papua National Congress, by 
Indonesian army personnel. This occurred after Eluay was invited to have dinner at an 
Indonesian Army base in West Papua on 11 November 2001.47 
                                                 
44 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Ending Repression in Irian Jaya, ICG Report No.23, 
Jakarta/Brussels, September 2001, 17. 
45 Ibid., 17. 
46 International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua, Ibid., 16. 
47 Ibid., 3. 
24 
One might claim that the New Order Era has sufficiently raised the standard of 
living, increased the prosperity, and improved the general welfare of West Papuans. But 
the cases of human rights violations, discrimination, injustice, marginalization, and 
alienation have very much hampered the Indonesian government’s efforts to integrate 
West Papuans comprehensively into Indonesian society. As a result, thirty-two years of 
the New Order Era have done little for development in West Papua. Instead, they have 
contributed to political development in that region, which worsened, especially after the 
downfall of Suharto in 1998. 
F.  CONCLUSION 
It is now clear that, since the beginning of its integration into Indonesia, West 
Papua has been a controversial subject. And because of the Indonesian government’s 
mismanagement, the controversy is getting worse and has generated another problem 
which makes the original problem even more complicated. The method of West Papua’s 
integration into Indonesia was odd and, actually, not quite acceptable, despite the fact that 
the process of West Papua’s self-determination, like other processes, was supervised by 
the United Nations and the international community. 
In the meantime, the Indonesian government’s policies governing West Papua, 
which emphasize a heavy-handed security approach, instead of dialogue and law 
enforcement, made a difficult situation in the region even worse. A number of cases of 
human rights violations, discrimination, and injustice evidence the failure of Indonesian 
policies in West Papua. In addition, the remaining backwardness of the West Papuans’ 
living conditions contributes greatly to the growing resentment and grievances among 
West Papuans, which is contradictory given the abundance of natural resources in this 
region. The New Order Era regime, which ruled for almost thirty-two years, did not seem 
interested in implementing comprehensive policies to address the socio-political and 
economic problems in West Papua. The regime was only interested in getting as much 
benefit as possible from the natural resources in West Papua in general, and, in particular, 
from the copper, gold, and forests. As a result, many West Papuans, who had already 
complained about all these government policies, lost faith in the Indonesian government 
and eventually concluded that independence would be a better choice.  
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III. A POLICY OF “SPECIAL AUTONOMY” IN WEST PAPUA 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Since 1969, the Indonesian government has tried many policies in West Papua in 
an attempt to solve its problems comprehensively. However, until the fall of Suharto in 
1998, most of the policies either failed or did not work as well as the government had 
expected. For instance, the security approach, which unintentionally marginalized the 
West Papuans, not only intensified tensions in the region, but also ultimately provoked  
additional problems, such as human rights violations and growing resentment among 
West Papuans. 
Finally, after all its policies were unable to solve the problem of West Papua, the 
Indonesian government realized that the issue was not simply a question of rebellion or 
secessionism, but rather the much more complex question of justice, human rights, 
prosperity, and economic opportunity. Therefore, the new government initiated a project 
aimed at finding a more realistic solution. At the same time, the government continued to 
adhere strictly to its concept of the non-negotiable status of the territory of the unitary 
Republic of Indonesia. The OPM, on the other hand, insisted on West Papua’s right to 
secede from Indonesia. Ultimately, in 2001, Indonesia enacted the Special Autonomy 
Law, which it claims is a good, plausible, and acceptable solution.  
B.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
1. The Theory of Autonomy and Autonomous Regions 
Today, declaring the “special autonomy” of a region, or declaring it an 
“autonomous region,” is one way to solve the problems of regional ethnic conflict, 
threatened secession, and rebellion. Territorial autonomy, according to Hurst Hannum 
and Richard B. Lillich, is generally accepted as a region’s right to independence in 
dealing with its internal domestic affairs. While recognizing that foreign affairs and 
defense are usually ruled by the central or national government, Hannum and Lillich also 
indicate that autonomy could imply the power to make international agreements in 
limited matters, such as those pertaining to the region’s cultural or economic interests.48 
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26 
In their arguments, they outline five important variables in an autonomous region 
regarding its executive power that must be discussed before the region can be even 
“minimally” categorized as an autonomous region. The variables are: 
1.  The political status of the local executive: Does he or she represent the 
 central government or the local government? How and by whom is the executive 
 selected? 
2.  The responsibility of the executive: Does the local executive administer 
 the laws of the central government? Does the central government retain 
 concurrent or separate powers to enforce national laws? 
3. The authority of the executive within the legislative process: Does the 
 local executive have a veto or other power over local legislation? 
4. The extent of local authority over normally national executive branch 
 matters such as foreign relation and defense matters. 
5. The extent of local police powers and the relation between the local and 
 national security forces.49 
Equally important, according to Hannum and Lillich, are: first, the existence of an 
elected legislative institution; second, the establishment of a free and independent 
judiciary system, even though this system is not totally separate from the national 
judiciary system; and, third, the greater right to control natural resources and a complete 
control over particular resources, such as water, forests, and non mining resources.50 
Furthermore, in keeping with the concept of autonomy, the local authority also has 
greater control over social and cultural issues such as the health system, education, public 
assistance, social security, cultural affairs, public housing, and labor affairs. Finance and 
economic matters, however, do not necessarily have to be under local control; instead, 
they can be divided into several entities which are ruled either by the central government 
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or the local authority.51 In sum, Hannum and Lillich stress that in order to be fully 
recognized as an autonomous territory there should be: 
First, . . . a locally elected body with some independent legislative power, . 
. . second, a locally chosen chief executive, who has general responsibility 
for the administration and execution of local laws or decrees, . . . third, an 
independent local judiciary, . . . fourth, the status of autonomy and at least 
partial self-government is not inconsistent with the denial of any local 
authority over specific areas of special concern to the principal/sovereign 
government, as opposed to the reservation by the sovereign of general 
discretionary powers, . . . fifth, full autonomy and self-government are 
also consistent with power-sharing arrangements between the central and 
autonomous government.52 
In addition, Svante E. Cornell, who outlines Heintze’s theory, notes that 
“autonomy in a political and legal context refers to the power of social institutions to 
regulate their own affairs by enacting legal rules.”53 Cornell argues that, in international 
law, autonomy is taken to mean that “parts of the state’s territory are authorized to govern 
themselves in certain matters by enacting laws and statutes, but without constituting a 
state of their own.”54 In this context, however, Cornell recognizes that the central 
government of any autonomous region is universally facing the same problem, which 
may trigger secessionism. He gives three arguable reasons: 
…first, they [central governments] fear that granting territorial autonomy 
to a minority group would be merely the first step toward the eventual 
secession of the region; second, granting autonomy to one region may be 
perceived as discrimination against other inhabitants or groups; and third, 
autonomy increases the risk of intervention by a foreign state affiliated 
with the specific minority population.55 
On the other hand, Andrew D. Mason perceives autonomy within a more substantial 
understanding and divides it into three respective perceptions with regard to its relation to 
the state. These perceptions are:  
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…first, respect for autonomy requires the state never to prevent the 
exercise of autonomy, except perhaps to avoid amoral catastrophe; second, 
respect for autonomy entails that the state always has a reason for not 
preventing its exercise, which it must take into account in its decision, but  
which may nevertheless be overridden; third, respect for autonomy 
requires that state to treat the exercise of autonomy as a goal to be 
promoted.56 
All the above theories clearly define the role of regional autonomy in conflict 
resolution. Some scholars believe that autonomy is reliable in solving the problem of 
secessionism or ethnic-based conflict, while others perceive autonomy only as one 
element of a more comprehensive approach.  
2.  Autonomy as Part of Conflict Resolution 
Most scholars agree that conflict regulations, which eventually can be 
transformed into conflict resolutions, are divided into three categories: territorial 
solutions, institutional solutions, and policy choices.57 Territorial solutions are divided 
into two choices: partition and federalism. Institutional solutions are divided into two 
options: constitutional/structural options and electoral/institutional devices.58 
Nonetheless, there are intense debates among scholars regarding the best proposal for 
solving the problem comprehensively.  
Meanwhile, in the case of West Papua, a territorial approach which proposes 
partition and federalism as its main concepts has strong support from the main actors in 
West Papua, especially the OPM and some of the elites. The Indonesian government, 
however, prefers a status of special autonomy as the most acceptable and reasonable 
solution. According to Katherine Adeney, “federalism’s institutionalization of [the] 
territorial division of political powers creates conditions for a new level of political 
debate to occur, both between the centre and the provincial unit and also within the 
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provincial unit.”59 Here, Adeney argues that federalism can bridge the tension between 
the center and the provinces by giving a possible political or economic front to debate 
many things, including broader political and economic rights to the provinces. However, 
she also admits that many scholars and politicians fear that this debate will be eventually 
regarding a secessionism.60 Furthermore, Adeney points out that, in order to be 
successful, federalism has to have as a precondition the existence of more homogeneous 
provinces.61 Adeney finds that there are at least four things that should follow this 
assumption: 
First, homogenous units should, wherever possible, be subdivided into two 
or more units . . . ; second, smaller units are likely to perceive advantages 
in secession or be viable units to do so . . . ; third, there should be no great 
disparities between the units in terms of size, population, or resources . . . ; 
and fourth, the optimal number of units should be more than three.62 
Unfortunately, many Indonesians associate federalism with Dutch efforts to 
maintain control over its colony, and to weaken the newly independent republic.  The 
origin of this negative sentiment about federalism is underlined by George Kahin, a 
closer observer and student of Indonesia in the 1940s and 1950s:  
The great majority of Indonesians were profoundly dissatisfied with the 
federal system with which they had been saddled by the Hague 
Agreement. In all fifteen Dutch-created states, this discontent soon began 
to manifest itself in spontaneous and widely based popular demands for a 
scrapping of what was conceived to be alien-imposed federalism and the 
liquidation of these states and their merger with the old Republic.63 
Moreover, a unitary form of government was also proclaimed by Indonesia’s founding 
fathers in the 1945 constitution, which gave more reason to Indonesian nationalists’ who 
saw Dutch-imposed federalism as, “an artificial legacy of their old colonial master.”64 
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According to Ferrazi, in recent years Indonesian politicians still strongly rejected the idea 
of federalism, as reflected during the election campaign in 1998.65 Most political parties 
prefer to move toward broader regional autonomy than pure decentralization which could 
lead to federalism.66 In their opinion, separatists will use federalism as a tool and 
justification to discuss secessionism, something the government tries to avoid. However, 
the decentralization policy, according to Ferrazi is “federalism within the unitary state” 
and can be perceived as Indonesian type of federalism, since an explicit form of 
federalism is strongly rejected.67 Therefore, from the realists’ point of view, practicing 
federalism is basically something that many people in Indonesia want to argue; but the 
format of this Indonesian type of federalism is still debatable. 
3. Controversies about the Partition Theory 
Another proposal for a territorial-based approach is partition, which, according to 
Chaim Kaufman, is the most viable solution for a stable resolution of an ethnic conflict. 
In this theory, Kaufman argues that whatever the resolutions are, a solution is only 
possible if the opposing groups are demographically separate.68 He then argues, 
“Separation reduces both incentives and opportunity for further combat, and largely 
eliminates both reasons and chances for ethnic cleansing of civilians.”69 He admits, 
however, that partition — although it can reduce ethnic hostilities, and in the long run 
might reduce “inter-ethnic antagonism” — does not resolve ethnic hatred.70 This theory 
has been a favorite of the OPM and other secessionist elements in West Papua. By 
arguing that West Papua is an entity that is different than the other parts of Indonesia, the 
OPM and West Papuans who favor independence want to emphasize that separation is 
the only possible solution for all the problems and conflicts in West Papua.  
In contrast, the Indonesian government sees special autonomy as a more realistic 
way to resolve the problems in West Papua, while keeping West Papua part of Indonesia. 
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The government also emphasizes that many countries, including the United States and the 
member-states of the United Nations, officially recognize Indonesian sovereignty over 
West Papua. The Indonesian government has always argued that what West Papua needs 
is not separatism, because that might only trigger bigger problems, namely the possibility 
of a disintegrating Indonesia, or a chaotic West Papua.71 
In keeping with that argument, Nicholas Sambanis argues that partition is not the 
only viable and credible solution to the ethnic conflict.72 And partition may only further 
the existing problems or it might trigger a different kind of problem, such as what has 
occurred recently in East Timor. In addition, Sambanis argues, “partition, as we have 
seen, does not help reduce the risk of war recurrence. Partitions are in fact positively 
(though not significantly) associated with the recurrence of ethnic war.”73 However, 
Sambanis agrees that,  
Partitions are more likely after costly ethnic/religious wars, after a rebel 
victory or truce, and in countries with better-than-average socioeconomic 
conditions. Partitions are more likely where ethnic groups are large; they 
are less likely to occur as the degree of ethnic heterogeneity increases.74 
He elaborates further,  
Only in the most extreme cases may partition be necessary, indeed 
inevitable. Those cases must be handpicked on the basis of political 
analysis of regional and global constraints, the history of the preceding 
war, and the special traits of the society in question . . . on average, 
partition may be an impossible solution to ethnic civil war.75 
Given all the existing debates, it is understandable that special autonomy would 
attract more attention from governments, including the Indonesian government, as the 
most feasible solution to secession problems, ethnic conflict, or separatism.  
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C. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND PRIOR TO 
THE INTRODUCTION OF SPECIAL AUTONOMY IN WEST PAPUA 
1. Stabilization from Suharto’s Perspective 
Indonesia has been relatively stable since the emergence of Suharto as its second 
president, following the downfall of Sukarno in 1968. Unlike in the Sukarno years, which 
were marked by political turmoil, economic deprivation, and several attempted 
rebellions, Suharto was quite successful in controlling all these problems. Under his 
government, Indonesia experienced an average eight-percent annual rate of economic 
growth. He put more emphasis than Sukarno had on stabilization in terms of both politics 
and socio-economics. And, achieving these objectives, Suharto tried to minimize the 
problems that might possibly occur and eventually distract from the process of national 
development. Unfortunately, instead of establishing long-term solutions, the Suharto 
regime favored short-term objectives in dealing with problems, especially the secession 
movements it faced in West Papua, East Timor, and Aceh. As a result, the problems in 
those regions worsened between the 1970s and 1990s.  
2.  Security as a Main Approach 
Until mid-1998, when Suharto unexpectedly resigned following the Asian 
financial crisis, the Indonesian government’s policy in West Papua was merely a 
continuation of the status quo. The security approach with all its side effects, including 
human rights abuses, still dominated government policies in West Papua. In terms of the 
political, the government banned all expressions of a so-called Independent West Papua, 
including meetings, demonstrations, flag raisings, speeches, and the provision of 
documents, pictures, and songs. Economic and social developments that were meant to 
improve the West Papuans’ socio-economic conditions unintentionally marginalized 
many of them from educational, economic and social opportunities. In spite of all the 
development in their region, the West Papuans were alienated. These circumstances 
contributed significantly to the increasing number of independence supporters in West 
Papua, especially among the youth who, after watching these developments, associated 
themselves with the struggle for independence. Suharto’s heavy-handed security 
approach, which was practiced not only in West Papua, but also throughout Indonesia, 
has been the source of most of the grievances in West Papua. They include human rights 
violations in the name of counter-separatist operations, arrest and detention without a fair 
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and free trial, and extrajudicial killings during counterinsurgency operations. Perhaps the 
situation in West Papua can best be described by the questions Indonesian officials 
addressed during a visit to West Papua: “Why do the [West Papuans] mistrust us so  
intensely? What have we been doing wrong in Irian Jaya? . . . How can we do better 
there?”76 These kinds of questions obviously reveal a significant level of ignorance on 
the part of the Indonesian officials. 
3.  The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and Its Implications for Indonesia 
 The 1997 Asian Financial crisis had a devastating effect on Indonesia, the 
hardest-hit country. In Indonesia, it evolved into a multidimensional crisis, socio-political 
as well as economic. During the period 1997–1999, Indonesia experienced political 
turmoil, which eventually forced President Suharto to resign; negative economic growth, 
exacerbated by a double-digit rate of inflation; an explosion of communal violence, the 
worst occurring in Moluccas, where it took more than 5,000 lives; and riots in some 
cities, most notably in Jakarta, where hundreds, if not thousands, of people died. These 
are the dire circumstances that incidents marked the rise of the new regime under 
President Habibie. The regime lacked legitimacy and lasted less than two years.  
Most important, during Habibie’s administration, the bloody separation of East 
Timor took place, following a referendum in August 1999. This event is one of the 
milestones in Indonesian history, and, more important, in the history of Indonesia’s 
territorial integrity. The separation of East Timor also raised speculation and predictions 
about the case of West Papua and served as a source of reference for the OPM and its 
supporters. The election in 1999 marked the end of Habibie’s regime and the beginning 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s as the fourth Indonesian president. Although Wahid, like his 
predecessor, made political blunders, there were a number of political developments that 
changed the course of politics in Indonesia. A number of developments have also taken 
place with regard to West Papua issue and ultimately resulted in the introduction of a 
policy of special autonomy. 
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D.  LAW NO. 21/2001: SPECIAL AUTONOMY FOR WEST PAPUA 
The enactment of a policy of special autonomy in West Papua resulted from was a 
long exhausting process involving many elements in West Papua and Jakarta. Special 
autonomy was seen as a triumph, especially by the pro-integration supporters in West 
Papua and the Indonesian government. However, it also won support from many people 
who previously had demanded independence,. because chapters of the special autonomy 
law accommodated many of their demands, with the obvious exception of a demand for 
independence. Therefore, it is understandable why so many people had high expectations 
that special autonomy would eventually solve, or at least reduce, the central problem in 
West Papua. 
1.  The Drafting Process 
The drafting of a special autonomy law for West Papua, as Peter King describes 
it, was heavily influenced by events in East Timor and Aceh. In addition, the process 
started amid high tension and suspicion between Jakarta and West Papua regarding the 
real intention of the central government, especially given the situation in Aceh and its 
future status as a special autonomous region.77 The situation was exacerbated by the 
introduction of Law No. 45, which divided West Papua into three new provinces, 
something the West Papuans perceived as an attempt to divide-and-rule the region.78  
The process began in November 2000, when Jaap Salossa became governor of 
West Papua. Having previously convinced the MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly) 
that West Papua, like Aceh, needed a policy of special autonomy, Salossa began the 
process of drafting a special autonomy bill by inviting local scholars, academics, 
activists, tribal elites, and customary figures, including some of the NGO representatives 
and religious organizations in this region. Early in the process, there was strong debate 
among the participants whether the word “independence” should appear in the draft. 
After several exhaustive meetings, the forum agreed to a final draft abolishing the word 
“independence,” using instead the word “autonomy.”79 As King emphasizes, “the West 
Papuan bill became the main reference for the special committee, set up by the DPR 
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(People’s Representative Council) to develop a special autonomy law.”80 Finally, after  
extensive consultation with all parties concerned, mostly elements from West Papua, Law 
No.21/2001 was passed by the DPR in November 2001 and went into effect on January 1, 
2002.81  
2.  Content of the Special Autonomy Law 
The Special Autonomy Law comprises twenty-seven chapters and seventy-nine 
articles. Among them, as Mohammad Hidayat points out, the law spells out explicitly 
several basic principles for conflict resolution: 
First, among those principles is the greater authority granted to the 
Province to implement its governance and manage its natural resources in 
the best interest of the local people. Second, the Law recognizes and 
respects the basic rights of indigenous West Papuans, and their strategic 
and basic empowerment. Third, it provides for good governance 
characterized by broader participation, development for the maximum 
benefit of the people, transparency, and accountability. Fourth, it provides 
a clear division of authority, labour, and responsibility between local 
institutions.82 
Additionally, the Law also provides broad opportunities for West Papuans to participate 
and contribute in shaping and directing local development strategies and regional 
policies. More important, the Special Autonomy Law also recognizes the existence of 
traditional rights and customary law.  
In its effort to implement the law, the government was required to form a West 
Papuan People’s Assembly, the Majelis Rakyat West Papua, or MRP, a legislative 
institution. This was unique to West Papua and made the province the first in Indonesia to 
have a bicameral legislature: the Regional People’s Representative Council (DPRD) and 
the MRP.83 MRP is a legislature body comprised of natives West Papuans who represent 
customary, religion, and women which elected for a five years term. The law went even 
further by recognizing the traditional symbols of West Papua, the flag and the anthem. It  
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stipulated, however, that, on formal occasions, the Indonesian national flag, the Red and 
White, and the national anthem, Indonesia Raya, should be performed before the West 
Papuan.84  
a. The Law: Political Issues 
In the Special Autonomy Law, political issues comprise thirty-two articles 
which include rules governing the executive, the legislatures, political parties, and the 
overall identity of the region. The most significant article is article nineteen, which 
governs the existence of the West Papuan People’s Assembly, the MRP. As was noted 
above, West Papua is the only province in Indonesia to have such a legislative body. The 
MRP consists of elected native West Papuan customary and religious representatives who 
serve for five years. As a uniquely West Papuan legislature body, the MRP has 
significant authorities, rights, tasks, and obligations. The most important are three 
provisions that authorize the assembly to consider and approve candidates for governor, 
candidates for the national People’s Consultative Assembly, and additions or changes to 
the Bill of Regional Laws.85 
b. The Law: Economic Issues 
In regard to economic issues, the law contains ten articles that govern 
financial matters such as taxes, revenues, trade, and industry. Of these, the most 
important issue, and one that is often debated in respect to West Papua, is how to divide 
the revenues from all the natural resources in the region. The Special Autonomy Law 
stipulates that one third of all natural-resource revenues should be given to the region. 
More specifically, it rules that eighty percent of the forestry, fishery, and general mining 
revenues must be allocated to the region. It also states that seventy percent of the natural-
oil-mining and natural-gas-mining revenues should be given to the region. Equally 
important is the law’s specifications about the sharing of taxes with the West Papuan 
authorities: ninety percent of the land and building taxes are allocated to the region, 
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twenty percent of the individual income taxes are allocated to the region, and eighty 
percent of the taxes from the  exercise of land- and building-acquisition.86 
c. The Law: Human Rights and Justice Issues 
Human rights and justice are ruled on in eight articles, including articles 
about the regional police force and the existence of a customary judiciary and customary 
laws. Article fifty-one addresses the conduct of the customary court, which dominates the 
life of West Papuans, especially in customary and religious matters. Human rights are 
ruled on in articles forty-five, forty-six, and forty-seven, all of which specify the 
government’s obligation to protect, respect, improve, and enforce human rights in the 
entire region and for the entire population. Article forty-five also notes the need to 
establish a representative for a Commission on Human Rights, a Human Rights Court, 
and a Commission on Righteousness and Reconciliation.87 
d. The Law: Socio-Cultural and Customary Rights 
West Papua’s socio-cultural and customary rights are ruled on in twelve 
articles. The protection of customary rights is mentioned specifically in two articles, 
numbers forty-three and forty-four. Religion is acknowledged in three articles, numbers 
fifty-three, fifty-four, and fifty-five, which state explicitly the freedom and right of 
religion for West Papuans. Education and culture are ruled on in articles fifty-six, fifty-
seven, and fifty-eight. And, finally, social matters are explained in articles sixty-five and 
sixty-six.88 
e.  The Law: Additional Articles 
The Special Autonomy Law has several additional articles, which address 
various subjects, including the environment, certain kinds of disputes, population and 
manpower issues, and supervision matters. The articles are obviously meant to enhance 
people’s overall comprehension of the policy of Special Autonomy. The additional 
articles lend a sense of popular complicity to Indonesia’s Special Autonomy ruling as a 
final government policy for West Papua. 
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In sum, the policy of special autonomy in West Papua consists of 
significant and comprehensive laws and regulations that are applicable to every aspect of 
the people’s lives. This is especially significant for West Papuans, who still live 
according to traditional customary laws and rights.  
It is important to note that the Special Autonomy Law leaves four basic 
aspects under the central government’s regulation: the defense system; the financial 
system, including the currency; the national police institution; and foreign policy. 
Nonetheless, it is generally believed that, if the law is implemented consistently, the 
central problems in West Papua will eventually be solved and the West Papuans will live 
peacefully as part of Indonesia. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
The policy of Special Autonomy is believed to be one of the best solutions 
possible for solving the problems of West Papua. Many scholars argue that implementing 
this concept will eventually solve the problem of secessionism in other countries, 
especially if it is caused by grievances that are the result of mismanagement by a central 
government. Some writers argue, however, that special autonomy may lead to more 
severe conditions if its implementation does not meet people’s expectations.  
In West Papua, the Special Autonomy Law, which was drafted by mostly 
indigenous West Papuan scholars, states explicitly all the requirements and conditions 
necessary to accommodate the secessionists’ demands, except for independence. But the 
law also specifies the Indonesian government’s rights in terms of defense, foreign policy, 
financial issues, the national police force, and justice affairs.  
Unfortunately, as we will discuss in the next chapter, implementation of the law 
has created more controversy than was expected. Indeed, some of the articles in the 
Special Autonomy Law were never implemented, while others were totally undermined 
by other laws. As a result, instead of solving the West Papua’s major problems, the law 







IV  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIAL AUTONOMY 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The special autonomy law described in the previous chapter is quite 
comprehensive in the areas of politics, the economy, socio-cultural aspects, human rights, 
and justice. It addresses many potential problems and provides good solutions to the 
grievances of West Papuans. The law, which was carefully formulated mostly by West 
Papuan scholars, has explicit rules governing important issues pertaining to West 
Papuans: political rights, economic opportunities, cultural differences, and human rights 
protection. If implemented properly, these regulations could provide a basis for better 
development in all aspects of West Papuan life. Sadly, the reality is far different than 
what was expected. 
Since its introduction in 2001, little of the special autonomy law has been 
implemented. Thus, the same problems continue in West Papua, not only in terms of the 
politics and the economy, but also regarding social issues and security. Typical cases 
include those of the West Papuan asylum seekers in February 200689 and the riots a 
month later, which took the lives of five Indonesian police officers and wounded one 
West Papuan.90 Progress in implementing the law has been undermined by the personal 
interests of politicians at the national and provincial levels. The combination of corrupt 
and incapable politicians and bureaucrats is worsening the situation in West Papua, 
despite high expectations surrounding the Special Autonomy Law. It is important, 
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B.  THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS 
1. Political Issues 
In regard to politics, there are at least three most “annoying” problems that 
demonstrate the half-hearted implementation of special autonomy. They are 1) the 
national government’s efforts to divide West Papua into three provinces, 2) the national 
government’s efforts to block the establishment of a well-functioning West Papuan 
People’s Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua, or MRP), and 3) West Papuans’ use of a 
certain flag as a symbol of their province. These three problems are explicitly described 
and covered by the law: chapter two addresses the flag symbol; chapter three, the 
regional divisions; and chapter five, part fourth, the MRP. 
a. The Division of West Papua into Three Provinces 
The controversy over the division of West Papua into three provinces 
began on September 16, 1999, when the Indonesian parliament passed Law No. 45 
mandating the division of Irian Jaya—the previous name of the province—into three 
provinces: West Irian Jaya, Central Irian Jaya, and the rump of Irian Jaya. The law also 
required the creation of four new districts: Paniai, Puncak Jaya, Mimika, and the city of 
Sorong.91 The provisions of this law were then strengthened by a presidential instruction 
issued in January 2003.92  
The creation of new provinces was a problem because it undermined the 
2001 special autonomy Law No. 21, which defines the region as a single entity. 
According to the International Crisis Group, these contradictory laws “infuriated many 
[West] Papuans, pro-independence and pro-autonomy alike, who have deep attachment to 
[West] Papua as a single political unit with a distinct history and who see the decree as a 
divide-and-rule tactic by the [central government].”93 
Meanwhile, proponents of the division presented several reasonable 
factors behind the division. One of the most significant rationales for autonomy pertains 
to administrative efficiency, which takes into consideration the factor that West Papua is 
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three and a half times the size of Java, which consists of six provinces.94 There is one 
thing, however, that caused the division to become even more controversial: it did not 
have the approval of the two West Papuan legislative bodies, the DPRD (provincial 
parliament) and the MRP, as is required by the special autonomy law.95 
                
 
Figure 4: The division of West Papua into three provinces (From: 
www.papuaweb.org accessed on 10/17/2006. available at 
<http://www.papuaweb.org/goi/pp/index.html#peta>) 
                 
b. The Establishment of the West Papuan People’s Assembly 
(MRP) 
The West Papuan People’s Assembly, or MRP, is clearly specified in 
article five of the law and consists of six articles, which define it and describe its 
membership, rights, and obligations.96 The formation of the MRP is what makes the 
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special autonomy law in West Papua unique, since it is the only province in Indonesia 
that has a bi-cameral legislature. Unfortunately, much controversy surrounds the creation  
of this institution which, according to some ultra-nationalist elements in Jakarta, is a 
starting point toward West Papuan independent. Hari Sabarno, the minister of internal 
affairs during President Megawati’s government argued, for example, that the MRP has 
such extensive powers that it may be a danger for the administration and stabilization of 
West Papua.97 In light of that assumption, it is no wonder that the Indonesian government 
assigned the national unity directorate general of the internal affairs ministry to oversee 
the formation of the MRP, which took more than four years before it was fully 
institutionalized.98  
Another serious challenge faced by the MRP was its membership 
formulation which, according to the law, had to represent various elements of the 
nonpartisan West Papuan society, who had also to be indigenous West Papuans. The 
central government’s involvement in the process of the MRP’s membership formulation 
created considerable skepticism among the West Papuans. They perceived the MRP – 
which was abruptly formed following the governor’s election in 2005 – as merely a lip-
service strategy from the central government merely to ease the demand for 
independence, but was not appropriately based on the principles of the special autonomy 
law.99 
c.  The Controversy over the Symbols of West Papua 
Chapter two of the law regulates the three symbols of the province of 
West Papua, which consist of a province symbol, a flag, and a hymn. These are not 
uniquely West Papuan, however. Most of the provinces in Indonesia have their own 
symbols, but in West Papua’s case, the symbols are also used and manipulated by some 
of the pro-independence figures to express their pro-independence aspirations and 
identity, which, they often argue, is different than and separate from Indonesia’s identity. 
As a result, despite the legality of the symbols, based on the special autonomy law, in 
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practice, the national government, police and military associate all activities involving 
West Papuans who use these symbols – most notably the flag – with the independence 
movement and therefore attempt to ban them.. The West Papuan flag, however, is also 
commonly associated by some of the independence activists with the OPM flag, instead 
of the province’s flag.  
 
                                             
Figure 5: West Papua Symbol and OPM Flag (From: www.papua.go.id; and 




  The Indonesian authority, represented by the police, treats harshly events 
where the West Papuan flag is raised. And the allegation of treason may then be made 
against persons involved in such events, with a possibility of spending twenty years in 
prison.100 
2. Economic Issues 
Aside from the controversy over West Papua’s integration process, the lack of 
economic development that benefits indigenous West Papuans is probably the most 
important cause of West Papuan resistance against the national government. Research 
shows that economic development is basically one of the most significant factors 
triggering the West Papuans’ grievances, especially when we consider that a number of 
multinational companies with assets worth billions of dollars are operating in West 
Papua. The most prominent and controversial company is Freeport McMoRan, which has 
operated in the province since shortly after the region was integrated into Indonesia. 
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Freeport’s presence has been a central cause of resentment for some elements in West 
Papua, as was evident in the latest bloody riot, in March 2006.101  
Statistical data shows that, despite four decades of integration into Indonesia, 
West Papua is still overwhelmingly backward in terms of its economy. Furthermore, 
some of the data from the statistical bureau indicates that West Papua’s economic 
condition, shown in Table 1, compared to the other Indonesian provinces, is far behind. 
According to Elmslie, West Papua’s economic exploitation is one of the factors fueling 
West Papuans’ resentment against the Indonesian government. He emphasizes that “The 
Papuan population has gained little economically from [Indonesia’s] rapid economic 
growth … The main beneficiary from the harvesting of Irian Jaya’s resources was the rest 
of Indonesian and especially Jakarta.”102  
In addressing economic progress in West Papua, there are three central issues that 
can be used to point out the “failure” of special autonomy. One issue is the fairness of the 
revenue contribution from all the natural-resources extraction in West Papua. Another is 
the budget allocation by the central government to West Papua. And a third issue is the 
problem of economic disparities between indigenous West Papuans and other 
Indonesians who migrate to this region. These three issues color every discussion 
regarding the economy of West Papua in West Papuans’ day-to-day life. Unfortunately, 
they have been on the surface for a while, with no significant sign that they will be 
resolved any time soon. 
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Table 1: West Papua economic growth 1995-2004 (From: West Papua Bureau of 



























Table 2: West Papua economic growth 1999-20004 (After: West Papua Bureau of 
Statistic, accessed on 10/17/2006. available at <http://www.papua.go.id/bps/>) 
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a. The Contribution of Natural Resources 
The special autonomy has ruled that national revenues from taxes on 
natural resources produced in West Papua must be shared with the provinces as follows: 
(1) forestry: eighty percent; (2) fishery: eighty percent; (3) general mining: eighty 
percent; (4) petroleum: seventy percent; (5) natural gas mining: seventy percent.103 This 
regulation, however, is hardly applied by the government, since there is no reliable data 
on how much revenue have been made by each of the companies operated in West Papua.  
Among all the natural resources exploration in West Papua, mining is still on the top of 
the list, followed by forestry, and fishery. Data on mining is relatively available, while on 
the other hand, data on forestry and fishery are quite murky, due to the weakness of 
system and regulation of these two sectors. 
According to West Papua government data, there were thirty mining 
companies in 2000,104 including the most prominent one, Freeport McMoran, which in 
accordance to 1991 work contract, possessed a 2,6 million square hectare area of 
exploration.105 Most of these companies are exploring copper, nickel, and gold which are 
extremely expensive in international market and trade. Equally important is the 
government’s plan to operate another giant company—BP Tangguh—which will be 
operated in 2008. The project will explore huge deposits --14.4 trillion cubic feet-- of 
liquid natural gas (LNG) in this region with estimation more than seven millions ton of 
LNG per annum.106 Obviously the operation of this project will add the possibility of 
more compensation and contribution to West Papua economy. Sadly, the reality is not 
always as planned.  
By taking the case of Freeport as an example, one will understand that it 
needs more effort to implement what has been planned. Financially, Freeport has been 
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giving a lot of contribution to Indonesian economy. In 2005 alone, the company has paid 
US$1, 17 million as part of tax, royalty and its dividend. During the period of 1992-2004 
the company paid US$ 33 million—2.73 percent of Indonesia GDP--to the Indonesian 
government.107 Based on this calculation, fifty five percent of West Papua GDRP has 
also come from Freeport contribution.108 However, in reality the impact of this 
contribution has been absorbed by only a “small number” of Indonesians and West 
Papuans, marked by the continuation of protest by some of West Papuans people with 
regard to the Freeport’s benefit to the societies and “protest” from the governor of West 
Papua who accused the Indonesian government was not “honest” in dividing the royalty 
from the company.109  
 
  2004 1992 - 2004 
Tax, Royalty, dividend, and miscellaneous 
payment US$    260.000.000 US$   2.600.000.000 
Total direct and indirect contribution US$ 3.000.000.000 US$ 33.000.000.000 
Table 3: Freeport financial contribution, 1992-2004 (From: PT. Freeport 
Indonesia.com; accessed on 02/10/2006. Available at 
<http://www.ptfi.com/Content.asp?id=1&cid=71>) 
 
Furthermore, one side effect of the continued existence of all these 
companies in the province is that West Papuans’ resentment shows no sign of decreasing. 
Indeed, the situation is getting worse. There have been a number of incidents in which the 
companies “clashed” with local communities, and the potential for human rights abuses 
and violations is currently very high. (This phenomenon will be discussed further in a 
subsequent human rights and justice section.) Clearly, the contribution of all these 
companies to West Papuan societies could significantly improve the West Papua 
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economic situation. The problem is how to get that contribution distributed among all 
West Papuans, not just a small number of Indonesians or West Papuan political elites. 
b. The Budget Allocation 
According to the special autonomy regulations, the budget allocation for 
West Papua must be “special,” which means bigger than the allocation of an average 
Indonesian province. The allocation comes, essentially, from two sources: the central 
government budget and West Papua’s regional revenues. More specifically, the budget 
allowance from the central government comes from a general allocation grant 
(DAU/Dana Alokasi Umum) and special autonomy funds (Dana Otsus). As specified by 
the special autonomy rules, the budget must include a certain percentage taken from 
regional revenues, as we noted in our discussion of natural resources. The budget, 
however, is not free of problems: there are issues of corruption and transparency.110 The 
most annoying aspect, however, is the use of this financial resource and the inadequacy 
of its control and management by West Papuan authorities. For instance, in fiscal year 
2005, the region received a budget allocation of US$183 million from the central 
government for special autonomy implementation.111 Nonetheless, as a Jakarta Post 
article points out, “forty percent of [West] Papuans are living below the poverty line – 
more than double the national average. One third of [West] Papuans’ children do not go 
to school, and nine out of ten villages do not have basic health service, with a health 
center, doctor or midwife.”112 
c. The Economic Disparities 
Another important issue with regard to West Papua’s economic situation is 
the level of economic disparity between the indigenous West Papuans and other 
Indonesians who live in West Papua. As Elmslie argues in his book, Irian Jaya Under the 
Gun, an increasing number of Indonesians in West Papua is inevitable, thanks to the 
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Indonesian government’s transmigration program. It not only changes the composition of 
the population, but also presents new challenges for West Papuans in terms of economic 
opportunity and competition.113 Although the government halted its transmigration 
program in 2000, Indonesians, especially from Java and South Sulawesi, still flow 
spontaneously to this region, which they perceive as a region of hope and 
entrepreneurship.114 Unfortunately, the consequence of this migration is more resentment 
by the indigenous people, who are forced to compete in many sectors, including 
economically, with the immigrants. As a result, indigenous West Papuans continue to feel 
more alienated in their own land, marginalized by immigrants who, in the eyes of 
employers, seem more reliable and efficient than the local residents.115  
The economic disparity between the local people and the Indonesian 
immigrants not only fuels regional tension, but also creates a wider gap between the 
indigenous people and the other Indonesians. Jaap Timmer argues that the problem is 
then exacerbated by poor governance, which he rightly emphasizes in his analysis of the 
situation in West Papua. 
Poverty levels in the highlands are the highest in Indonesia and economic 
disparities lead to regional tensions. Poor governance is widening the gap 
between local people and the government. On top of that, decades of 
poorly controlled military action have generated a widespread collective 
memory of violence and humiliation. These accumulated factors conjure 
up the demon of independence that so easily mobilizes Papuans and 
paralyses Jakarta.116 
Economic disparity, however, is not an independent problem. It is strongly related to 
other problems, such as the level of education, the socio-cultural background, and the 
availability of opportunity. The government clearly has an important role in this matter to 
stipulate and assist the indigenous people to catch up with the Indonesian immigrants. 
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3.  Socio-Cultural Issues 
The twelve articles of the special autonomy law cover a number of socio-cultural 
issues. Some mention specifically the degree of rights and obligations that the West 
Papuans and the government have to satisfy the legal requirements. Implementation of 
these articles, however, as with the political and economic issues, is far from what was 
expected, even five years after the law’s promulgation. Problems exist in every sector, 
social and cultural, and at every level of West Papuan society: whether villages, suburbs, 
or cities. Some indicators – such as the level of education, the level of poverty, the level 
of illiteracy, and so forth – show just how far the implementation of the law has or hasn’t 
worked throughout all levels of society. Observers of the law’s implementation in West 
Papuan society find that those indicators reveal the “failures” of special autonomy. Some 
of the indicators are represented by data in the field, while others are represented by the 
“controversies” that surround these matters. 
a. Education 
Article fifty-six of the law determines that education is part of the domain 
of the provincial government, which must regulate all aspects related to education, from 
the curriculum to the overall system. In article forty-seven, the law requires that the 
educational system be used to promote and preserve the West Papuan identity, culture, 
and customs.117 Also, the law specifically says that education is meant to elevate the 
living standard of mainly the indigenous people, who, intentionally or not, have been 
marginalized, especially during the new-order era.  
Controversy occurred when the Indonesian parliament passed an education 
law that introduced a new educational system for all of Indonesia. During the debates and 
process of developing this law, neither the central government nor the parliament 
considered the necessity to exclude special regions, like West Papua, from being subject 
to the new law.118 As a result, the already suspicious West Papuans became increasingly 
skeptical of the government’s intentions, not only in regard to the educational system, but 
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to other issues as well. According to Laurence Sullivan, “It is this attitude and also the 
basic lack of knowledge about Otsus [special autonomy] in Jakarta, which is causing 
many problems.”119 Additionally, the data pertaining to education in West Papua, as 
shown in Figure 8, is clear evidence that, despite the effort and money committed to 




West Papuans who failed to complete elementary school  
    
   49.6 % 
 
West Papuans graduated from elementary school 
    
    21.64 % 
 
West Papuans graduated from senior high school 
    
    10.06 % 
 
West Papuans graduated from university  
      
     1.9  % 
Table 4: Education achievement of West Papua in 2003  (After: Nethy Dharma 
Somba. 74 percent of Papuans live in isolation and poverty. The Jakarta Post. August 19, 




 West Papua Indonesia 
Men 58 % 90 % 
Women 44 % 78 % 
Table 5:  Comparison of Literacy Rate in West Papua and Indonesia  (After: Neles 
Tebay. West Papua: The Struggle for Peace with Justice. Catholic Institute for 
International Relation. London. 2005) 
 
b.  Poverty, Health, and the Living Standard 
West Papuans’ living conditions probably are among the most 
controversial issues, due to the fact that, in terms of its natural resources and budget 
allocation, the province of West Papua is among the five richest provinces and receives 
the biggest annual budget allotment in all of Indonesia. Unfortunately, some indicators in 
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the field do not support a theory of simultaneous equivalency that defines a society’s 
growth and prosperity by looking at only its wealth and resources.  
In 2003, Governor Jaap Salossa reported that “74.24 percent of the more 
than 2.3-million-strong population is living in remote areas such as steep slopes, isolated 
isles, and deep gorges, without access to proper transportation and other public 
facilities.120 He added: “poverty was the cause of a low quality of life in [West] Papua, 
with the infant mortality rate standing at seventy-nine per one thousand births.”121 
Moreover, according to statistics from the Ministry of Development and 
Disadvantaged Regions, nineteen out of twenty-nine regions in West Papua are 
categorized as “underdeveloped.”122 Based the data, therefore, it is  not surprising that 
39.2 percent of West Papuans live under the poverty level,123 and twenty-five out of 250 
tribes are still living without outside contact.124 This sad picture of West Papuans’ social 
condition is worsened by numerous incidents of such factors as famine,125 death-related 
diarrhea, and malaria,126 and an increasing number of HIV/AIDS cases thirty times the 
national average.127  All these indicators clearly demonstrate that special autonomy, 
which has been in West Papua since 2001, has had little impact on people’s everyday 
lives, especially the indigenous and ordinary West Papuans. 
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 West Papua 
Human Development Index  60,1  (29th ) 
Life expectancy 2003 65,2 (year) 
Poverty Level  39,2 % 
Average Education length 6 (year) 
Literacy Rate 74,4 % 
Table 6:  Data of West Papuan living conditions in 2003  (From: West Papua 
statistic bureau. Accessed on 10/17/2006. available at <http://www.papua.go.id/bps/>) 
 
 
c.  Rhetoric of Culture Protection 
Two articles of the special autonomy law cover cultural protection aspects. 
Article fifty-seven says that “the provincial government shall protect, foster, and develop 
the culture of [West] Papuan natives.”128 Article fifty-eight specifies the government’s 
obligation to “maintain and stabilize” the identity of West Papuans.129 Thus, according to 
those articles, the government must play an active role in protecting aspects of West 
Papuan culture. The reality, however, is disturbingly opposite. Instead of maintaining and 
stabilizing the culture, the government is accused not only of being negligent, but also of 
endangering West Papuan culture by allowing the continuous presence of other 
Indonesians in West Papua. Many scholars have addressed this continuation of 
“Indonesianization” in West Papua. West Papuans are being forced to change their way 
of life, which, according to the government, is neither civilized nor healthy.  
Furthermore, in the name of modernization and development, West 
Papuans are being encouraged to change their traditions, customs, and even their 
identity.130 As Neles Tebay, a priest in Jayapura’s diocese, explains,   
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A significant example of the undermining of West Papuan culture is the 
way that West Papuans have been separated from their land. In former 
days, the West Papuans were the owners of the forest under customary 
adat (traditional law) . . . under Indonesian rule, West Papuans were no 
longer considered as the owners of ancestral lands. Their lands were 
plundered on the pretext of national development, and their forests 
expropriated and exploited.131 
4. Human Rights and Justice 
Human rights and justice comprise one of the most apparent areas in which 
special autonomy has failed to improve conditions for the indigenous West Papuans. 
Since 2001, the year the law was launched, a number of human-rights- and justice-related 
incidents have occurred in West Papua. All have hampered efforts to improve the image 
of West Papua, which has been devastated by cases of human rights violations and 
abuses. These were committed mostly by the Indonesian military, especially during the 
New Order era. Many scholars argue that the continuation of a security approach by the 
Indonesian government is the main cause of these violations. Therefore, even though the 
law respects human rights, in practice, human rights are put aside in the name of security 
and stability. Nonetheless, since President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected in 
2004, the situation is getting better. Regrettably, a number of unexpected incidents have 
inevitably occurred, which undermine the government’s pledge to improve the human 
rights situation. 
Another important issue is the absence of human rights institutions, which, 
according to special autonomy, have to be established in West Papua. These institutions, 
including human rights courts and a commission of righteousness and reconciliation, are 
explicitly expressed in the special autonomy law as a mean to achieve and maintain a 
conducive human rights situation in which indigenous people are respected and treated 
fairly, are equal, and are free from fear and intimidation.132 Five years after the 
promulgation of the law, not a single human rights court has been established in West 
Papua. The commission of truth and reconciliation is merely rhetorical. As a result, 
                                                 
131 Neles Tebay. West Papua: The Struggle for Peace with Justice. Catholic Institute for International 
Relation. London. 2005, 12. 
132 www.papuaweb.org. Special Autonomy Legislation. Articles 45-47.   
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skepticism and cynicism among West Papuans increasingly colors their everyday 
interactions with the government, whether provincial or central government.   
A more disturbing picture described by Human Rights Watch relates to the 
Indonesian military’s practices in West Papua, which, according to the 2006 report, are 
“characterized by undisciplined and unaccountable troops committing widespread abuses 
against civilians, including extrajudicial executions, torture, forced disappearances, 
arbitrary arrests and detentions, and drastic limits on freedom of movement.”133 The 
report also notes, however, that in September 2005, two police officers were tried in a 
human rights court in Makassar for the killing of three West Papuan students and the 
torture of a hundred civilians.134 It is also important to note that human rights violations 
are committed not only by Indonesian authorities, but also by some of OPM members, as 
shown in Table 6. Clearly, the continuation of this chain of violence will only intensify 
the tension between West Papuans and the Indonesian military and police on the one 
hand, and between the indigenous people and Indonesian immigrants on the other.  
Fortunately, an accusation of “genocide” in West Papua, though debatable and 
dependent on one’s perspective, is not true.135 A recent report by the ICG, which 
discusses this matter, finds that the two reports that include the accusation – “Indonesian 
Human Rights Abuses in West Papua: Application of the Law of Genocide to the History 
of Indonesian Control,” by students at Yale Law School; and “Genocide in West Papua? 
The Role of the Indonesian State Apparatus and a Current Needs Assessment of the 
Papuan People,” by Sydney University’s John Wing and Peter King – have many factual 
errors.136 The ICG does admit, however, that a severe human rights violation occurred 
during the 1970s’ military campaign.137 
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a. The kidnapping of two Belgians by OPM. 
b. The attacking of TNI post by OPM. 
c. The assassination of Theys Elluay, the chairman of West Papua 






a. An ambush killed two American and one Indonesian. At first, the 
Indonesian military was highly suspected behind the incident; 
however, later on, based on joint investigation by FBI and 
Indonesian Police, it has proved done by OPM. 
b. A shooting of human rights activist’s wife—Elsie Rumbiak 

















a. A shooting by unknown gunman wounded military personnel. 
b. An attack to a military facility killed two officers, and one of the 
attackers who were identified as an OPM member. The attackers also 
took away some of the TNI rifles.  
c. A gunfight between the Indonesian military and OPM killed two 
unidentified OPM member. 
d. KONTRAS (Indonesian Human Rights Affiliated Organization) 
accused military killing sixteen civilian during the military operation 
responded the incident of military facility’s raid in May 
e. A gunfight killed two of OPM member 
f. Clashes between West Papuans regarding the controversy over the 
creation of Central Irian Jaya province claimed three lives. 
g. Two un-indigenous people killed and four injured after attacked 
by indigenous people. 
h. TNI killed ten OPM members in a raid, including one of the 






a. Police killed two OPM. 
b. One killed over clashed disputed Indonesian independence day 
c. Police shot to dead one local people 
d. A raid over military base, killed one OPM and one TNI injured 
e. Six person killed by OPM attack to construction workers. 








a. Security officer shot to dead a local people 
b. Riot, four Indonesian Police officer and one Indonesian Air force 
personnel were killed, one demonstrator wounded. 
c. Four die in an attack, two TNI and two OPM, two injured 
d. Two died in clash with police 
e. Ten died in tribal war 
f. Three die in tribal war. 
Table 7:  Human –rights-and –justice-related incidents 2001-2006 (After: The 
Jakarta Post in Period January 2001-October 2006, compiled by author) 
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C.  IMPLICATIONS 
The failure of special autonomy will have serious implications and consequences 
for the Indonesian government both domestically and internationally. One obvious 
consequence is that Indonesia’s territorial integrity will be put at high risk. After “the 
loss” of East Timor in 1999, many scholars assumed that a similar incident would trigger 
the so-called “Balkanization” of Indonesia which is the worst thing that could happen. 
1.  Domestic Implications 
Domestically, the failure of special autonomy in West Papua will influence all 
government policies, not only in West Papua, but also in other regions, especially since 
special autonomy is a continuation of the central government’s decentralization policy. In 
addition, there are three other important implications that the government must take into 
serious consideration; otherwise, Indonesia will start to fall apart. 
a. Credibility of Central Government is at Risk 
Special autonomy has been used by the Indonesian government to show its 
intention to resolve West Papua’s problems peacefully, as it did in Aceh. However, 
unlike Aceh, where the implementation of a peace process and so forth went well, West 
Papua is a messy place. The Indonesian government’s credibility and capability will be at 
high risk if the current situation in West Papua continues. And once it loses its credibility, 
it will be hard for the central government to impose its policies on the provinces. As a 
result, the already “difficult” relation between the central government and the regions 
will continue and worsen. 
b. Disintegration of West Papua 
The disintegration of West Papua will become obvious. Special autonomy 
was expected to be a final solution for all the problems in West Papua. By introducing 
special autonomy, the Indonesian government hoped it would change West Papuans’ 
perceptions and attitudes toward the government. Sadly, the blunders in its 
implementation will just give the West Papuans another reason to demand their 
independence, something the government wants to avoid. 
c. Disintegration of Indonesia 
A more devastating estimation is the disintegration of Indonesian itself. 
The central government’s disability in holding West Papua as part of Indonesia will 
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definitely trigger the same demand from other provinces. Even if this assumption is too 
pessimistic, from their experiences during the early phase of the reformation era, 1997–
1999, some regions have echoed that demand: for instance, Bali, Riau, Moluccas, and 
even South Sulawesi. There will be always opportunist figures or politicians that will try 
to take advantage of this issue, as they have in the past. Unfortunately, the cost of 
Indonesia’s disintegration will be too high. 
2.  International Implications 
Internationally, the failure of special autonomy will influence and determine the 
situation not only in West Papua, but also in other parts of Indonesia. And, given today’s 
era of globalization, there will be no way for the Indonesian government to deny or avoid 
the implications and consequences of its mismanagement in West Papua. The 
International community will make sure that the Indonesian government is “punished” if 
the situation in West Papua continues or worsens. There are three important implications 
that should be pointed out here as a direct result of the failure of special autonomy. 
a. Worsen Indonesian’s Image 
Indonesian’s international image has, to some extent, gradually become 
“normal” since the election in 2004, which put Indonesia on the list of democratic 
countries after more than three decades under authoritarianism. The continuation of many 
problems, however, has undermined this image. Some of the problems are a continuation 
of problems that occurred at the beginning of the reformation era, during the period 
1997–1999. During that period, Indonesia was known as a place of communal violence, 
riots, ethnic conflict, corruption, and so forth. The failure of special autonomy will add to 
the long list of problems in Indonesia, and obviously will further justify the belief that 
Indonesia is just what the international community thought it was.  
b. Political Pressure 
Politically, the failure of special autonomy, marked by the problems with 
its implementation, will result in pressure on the Indonesian government from the 
international community. West Papua is already widely seen as an international issue, 
even if only three Pacific countries – Vanuatu, Nauru, and Tuvalu – officially recognize 
the existence of OPM as an independence movement demanding self-determination.  
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Most countries officially recognize Indonesia’s sovereignty over West Papua.138 
However, many countries also express their concern over West Papua for various 
reasons, such as democratization, the economy, minority rights, justice, human rights, 
and global warming. All of these issues must be taken seriously by the Indonesian 
government, because, in the past, they have been used by the international community to 
influence, pressure, and determine Indonesian government policies. Clearly, any failure 
of government policy in West Papua will put the Indonesian government at the center of 
attention for the international community as, for example, was the case recently regarding 
the West Papuan asylum-seekers.139 
c.  Economic Pressure 
Economic pressure is obviously a natural continuation of political 
pressure. Economic aid and assistance are always followed by certain conditions. 
Unfortunately, Indonesia is known as one of the international community’s biggest aid 
recipients. And, with so many countries and international financial organizations 
involved in budgeting the development in Indonesian, the economic implications are 
inevitable, especially considering the amount of foreign investment taking place in West 
Papua. 
D.  CONCLUSION 
Special autonomy has been cheered by some of its proponents as a good policy of 
the Indonesian government in its attempt to solve West Papua’s problems 
comprehensively. Regrettably, as discussed here, the implementation remains unclear.  A 
half-hearted implementation from the Indonesian government put special autonomy at 
high risk of failure. The consequences of another policy failure, especially for West 
Papua, which has experienced so many policy failures of the Indonesian government, will 
inevitably have diverse implications and consequences. And the West Papuans and the 
rest of Indonesian are obviously the ones who will have to deal with these consequences, 
like it or not. Unfortunately, consequences are always associated with unpleasant 
situations.  
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Indonesia has existed as a state for sixty-one years. During that time, it escaped 
many worst-case scenarios, which might have threatened its survival as a nation. That 
survival came at a tragic cost, however: the lives of thousands of Indonesians. Many 
bloody incidents, which, unfortunately, seemed inevitable, marked Indonesia’s continued 
existence as a state. Sukarno’s Old Order, Suharto’s New Order, and the Reform Era, saw 
hundreds of violent incidents that took the lives of many Indonesians. Regrettably, this 
was also the case in West Papua. 
Since the Act of Free Choice and West Papua’s controversial integration into the 
Republic of Indonesia in 1969, that province has dominated the Indonesian media’s news 
reports of violence, backwardness, negligence, marginalization, and so forth. Continually, 
the news from West Papua on any given day is represented in those terms. An 
accumulated sense of desperation, helplessness, hopelessness, humiliation, and anger 
intensifies the West Papuans’ grievances and their resentment of the central government. 
The general feeling of exploitation that prevails seems inevitable, especially in light of 
the damage done by mining, legal or illegal; by logging, more by illegal than legal 
companies; and by an out-of-control fishing industry. At the same time, most West 
Papuans live beneath the poverty level with all the consequences of that, such as 
illiteracy, unhealthy living conditions, endemic disease, unemployment, AIDS, and 
backwardness. 
The Indonesian government’s policy toward West Papua, which relies primarily   
on a heavy-handed security approach, is clearly one of the main sources of the West 
Papuans’ growing resentment. It is simply astonishing that, after more than three decades 
of integration into the Republic of Indonesia, the same problems and grievances as in the 
beginning continue to hamper the lives of West Papuans. Although similar problems – 
poverty, illiteracy, backwardness – also occur in other parts of Indonesia, the Indonesian 
government was supposed to pay particular attention to West Papua, so as to avoid the 
“internationalization” of this problem, since the problems also involved arrangements 
made by the international community.  
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Ironically, the New Order Era, which was perceived as an era of development for 
Indonesia, had little impact in West Papua. This region was still treated like a second- 
class region where the “must-crush” OPM existed. No wonder the thirty-two years of the 
New Order Era were cheered only by a small number of West Papuans. Basically, the 
Indonesian government had tried a number of different policies in West Papua, but it 
lacked the strong political will needed to solve the problems comprehensively, to address 
the grievances, and to improve the overall conditions in the province. As a result, instead 
of being resolved, the problems in West Papua continue and seem even to worsen. 
A.  CONCLUSION 
1. The Failure of Special Autonomy in West Papua 
Special autonomy was launched in November 2001. The law was drafted mostly 
by West Papuan scholars with the governor of West Papua, Jaap Salossa, as the leader. 
Special autonomy was discussed extensively by West Papuan scholars and politicians, as 
well as the Indonesian parliament, before it passed into law. Originally, special autonomy 
was intended as a conflict-resolution measure in West Papua, and thus had been long 
awaited by the West Papuans. Unfortunately, as this thesis has shown here, their hopes 
remain unfulfilled. Instead of being a solution, the law has created even more resentment 
among West Papuans, who skeptically perceive the law as merely another empty promise 
by the Indonesian government. 
These circumstances, too, seem inevitable, because even now, five years after the 
law’s promulgation, the Indonesian government is still struggling to find an appropriate 
method for implementing some of the law’s articles. Moreover, the situation has been 
worsened by the central government’s many political and economical blunders in 
implementing the law. As a result, some highly controversial policies – political, 
economic, and socio-cultural – have been applied in West Papua. These have had severe 
consequences, including: violent incidents which took the lives of mostly West Papuans; 
incidents of famine and starvation which also took lives; and increasing number incidents 
of deaths caused by illness. It is not unrealistic to assume, therefore, given all of the 




2. The Problems of Implementation 
Special autonomy is undeniably a very good method for resolving conflicts such 
as those in West Papua. Indeed, West Papua’s special autonomy law includes many 
articles that directly address West Papuan grievances. These articles are applicable, 
specifically, for example, to the political, economic, socio-cultural, human-rights, justice, 
and environmental matters in West Papua. Many experts believe that, if all the articles 
were fully implemented, the province of West Papua would no longer be such a problem 
for the Indonesian government. Regrettably, what was intended as a good opportunity for 
solving the West Papua problem turned out to be disappointing. While the law appears 
good conceptually, it falls short in the implementation. 
Some of the disturbing realities of the special-autonomy law’s implementation 
had to do with the everyday affairs ruled by the law. The implementation was 
handicapped in its application to political, economic, socio-cultural, human-rights, and 
justice issues. Some of the problems that occurred were intentionally created by the 
central government; some occurred as a result of weak, ignorant, corrupt, and 
incompetent governance, by both the central and the regional governments. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that many West Papuans are deeply disappointed in the government, 
particularly the central government, which, after more than four decades, is still 
promising to improve the economy, living conditions, infrastructure, political rights, 
human rights, and cultural protection of the West Papuans.  
Equally annoying is the fact that some of these problems still persist, with no 
clear sign that they will be solved soon by the government.  The government seems to 
have no strong political will to address and overcome these problems. If the situation 
remains the same, the Indonesian government may face severe consequences, including a 
possible “internationalization” of the West Papua problem, which could lead to a 
situation similar to that of East Timor. The government must act now, or the situation 
will worsen, and it will be too late. The disintegration of any part of Indonesia, such as 




B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The preceding discussions focused on the implementation problems of special 
autonomy in West Papua. This section will present some recommendation for the 
Indonesian government in general, and for the provincial government of West Papua in 
particular, including all the departments under its control and coordination.  
These recommendations are intended as yet another opinion for the government 
of Indonesia to consider in regard to the implementation of special autonomy, with all its 
problems and complications, in West Papua. Therefore, it is necessary that these 
recommendations be understood by the persons in charge, both conceptually and in their 
practical in-the-field application. The combined understanding from these two key 
perspectives will determine how much improvement in the law’s implementation will 
take place. 
1. The Political Factors 
Politically, the Indonesian government must address and seriously review the 
three problems discussed in Chapter IV. These problems are by far the most 
controversial, politically, since they clearly undermine the special autonomy law. 
a. Review the Division of West Papua into Three Provinces 
 First, this thesis recommends that the Indonesian government cancel Law 
No. 45/1999, which requires the division of West Papua into three provinces. This law 
contradicts and undermines the law of special autonomy, which perceives West Papua as 
a single entity. In addition, the paper recommends that the government also cancel the 
presidential instruction that calls for the speeding up of that tripartite division. Obviously, 
this will be difficult, since the three provinces have already been established. However, 
for the Indonesian government to be consistent, this must be done in accordance with 
special autonomy.140 The Indonesian government could at least re-process the division, 
using the appropriate methods and regulations as stipulated by the special autonomy 
laws. Special autonomy itself requires the approval of the MRP for any such political 
decisions. Hopefully, the division of West Papua, if unavoidable, would through those  
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measures be made more politically and ethically acceptable to the West Papuans. At 
least, there could be no accusation that the central government is playing a game of 
“divide and rule.”  
b. Evaluate West Papua’s Relationship with the MRP 
 As mandated by the special autonomy law, the MRP (Majelis Rakyat 
Papua) serves as a legislative body in West Papua and, together with the DPRD (West 
Papua Parliament), determines and oversees all decisions pertaining to West Papua’s 
governance and laws. There is a nuanced undermining of this, however. Because of a 
growing fear among the central government officials and politicians in Jakarta that the 
MRP will become a starting point for West Papuan independence, the central government 
wants to reduce the MRP’s power. The Indonesian government needs to do away with 
such fears. Instead of developing suspicious sentiments, the central and regional 
governments could use the MRP to bridge the gap between Jakarta and Jayapura, and 
thus achieve a mutual understanding of the pertinent factors: the concept and law of 
special autonomy; the concepts of the NKRI, the Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia/ 
(The Unity of the Indonesian Republic); and the concept of Indonesian nationalism. 
c.  Redefine the Regulations Governing West Papua Symbols 
 This thesis recommends that the regulations governing West Papua’s 
symbols also be reconsidered, so as to more broadly accommodate the spirit of “free 
expression” among West Papuans. This is especially crucial in regard to the raising of the 
OPM flag, which is already perceived as one of the symbols of West Papua. The 
Indonesian security apparatus, especially the Indonesian police, must handle every case 
of flag-raising carefully, with full awareness of and concern for possible political and 
international implications of any harsh response. By differentiating case by case, using 
prevention-and-persuasion measures, the Indonesian government can avoid the backfire 
effects of any hostile actions in such incidents. In addition, the government also must 
publicize the laws regarding this sort of behavior, which often happens because of a lack 





2. The Economic Factors 
This paper recommends that, in economic matters, the Indonesian government 
evaluate what has been done, especially regarding the three important issues outlined in 
Chapter IV, which dominate the grievances and resentment of West Papuans. 
a. Follow the Laws Governing Natural Resources Percentages  
 As ruled in the special autonomy law, West Papua is entitled to a 
significant percentage of the shared natural-resources revenue. The recommendation, 
therefore, that the central government fulfill the legal arrangement – without objection – 
let alone any effort to deviate, for whatever reason. By doing so, the government will 
send a strong message to the West Papuans regarding its responsibility and sincere 
dedication to the development and improvement of West Papua. 
b. Better Control and Management of the Annual Budget 
 Corruption has been chronically rooted in West Papua.141 As a result, 
despite the large amount of the annual budget allocated to this region every year – 
especially after the introduction of special autonomy – poverty, backwardness, illiteracy, 
and disease still hamper the lives of West Papuans.142 The government, both central and 
provincial, must take the necessary steps to ensure that expenditures of the annual budget 
go in the right direction to meet the designated targets and objectives. Tight control and 
smart management will be required in this effort, which also must be followed by a 
strong, indiscriminate enforcement of the law. 
c.  Reduce the Economic Disparities 
 This thesis recommends that the government create an alternative 
economic system which provides indigenous West Papuans strong incentives and more 
facilities, such as easy access to bank credit, training, protection, and subsidies, in starting 
economic activities.  The government also needs to create activities that will better 
accommodate indigenous West Papuans and encourage them to take advantage of more 
opportunities to improve the West Papuan economy. In addition, a so-called padat karya 
(labor-intensive) projects are also needed in accommodating high unemployment in this 
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province.  This step is necessary because the conventional economic system has created a 
huge gap between the indigenous West Papuans and Indonesian migrants. By adopting 
this policy step-by-step, the gap between the two groups – indigenous and migrants – will 
be reduced, which means no more feelings of jealousy, marginalization, and alienation. 
3. The Socio-Cultural Factors 
In regard to the social and cultural issues, the government must pay closer 
attention to the problems in education, poverty, the healthcare system, living conditions, 
and cultural protections. The existence of these problems not only fuels the feeling of 
abandonment among West Papuans, but also ultimately gives them no incentive to live as 
part of the greater Indonesia.  
a. Education as Part of Culture Preservation 
 This thesis recommends that the government review the application of the 
national education laws in West Papua, which, at present, does not represent the spirit of 
the special autonomy law. As this paper has shown in the earlier discussion, the current 
generalized application of the national education law undermines the articles of education 
in the special autonomy law which were meant to preserve and promote the culture of 
indigenous West Papua. By reviewing and reevaluating these measures, the government 
would once again be credited with having the political will to fulfill the special autonomy 
law as part of its overall attempt at conflict resolution in West Papua. Furthermore, the 
government must work very hard to increase the literacy rate of West Papuans by 
providing more opportunities for the people to have access to education, whether through 
formal or informal means.  
b. Overcome Poverty, Increase the Living Standard, and Provide a 
Good Healthcare System 
 The heading points out the classic problems in West Papua which have 
existed since its integration into the Indonesian state. We strongly recommend that the 
government work harder in these matters, with close and careful interdepartmental 
coordination. The government must redefine its strategy in order to overcome a number 
of obstacles, for instance, cultural barriers, a lack of infrastructure, and limited resources. 
Equally important is the determination of certain achievable objectives that can be 
reached and measured within a set timeframe. By adopting these policies, the government 
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could move step-by-step in the right direction for improving the living standards, 
reducing the number of people living in poverty, and ameliorating the healthcare system. 
c. Taking a Real Step toward Culture Protection 
This thesis recommends that the government change its approach in regard 
to protecting and promoting the West Papuan culture. The first step in doing so is to stop 
forcing West Papuans to change their culture, identity, and customs in the name of 
modernization and development. The government could create special regulations as a 
follow-up to the special autonomy law, to achieve the objectives of protecting, fostering, 
and developing the culture of West Papua. In addition, the government also could initiate 
the establishment of cultural pocket-areas protected by the government and the law. 
These policies are greatly needed, given the great impact of cultural globalization that 
tends to undermine local values and traditions. By adopting these recommendations, the 
government could prevent the accusation that it is intentionally trying to eliminate the 
West Papuan culture. Instead, the government would be hailed for its concern for and 
protection of the indigenous culture.  
4. Human-Rights and Justice Factors 
a. Carefully Plan and Conduct Military and Police Operations  
This research finds that the human-rights violations in West Papua are a 
direct result of the continuation of the security approach that characterizes military and 
police operations against the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka). Many times, anti-
guerilla military operations have an unanticipated side effect: they trigger incidents of 
human rights abuse and, ultimately, human-rights violations. Because of this unfortunate 
situation, this thesis recommends that the government review and evaluate the current 
strategy and procedures being used in military and police operations in West Papua. By 
more carefully planning and conducting its police and military operations, the 
government could minimize the unnecessary and excessive effect of these operations on 
West Papuan society in general, and on indigenous West Papuans in particular. 
In implementing these changes, the abolition of a generalized harsh and 
biased mentality in the Indonesian security apparatus could be critically important, for the 
current tendency is to perceive any and all incidents involving indigenous West Papuans 
as directly associated with the OPM. By taking steps to modify that general impression, 
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incidents would more likely be treated on the basis of the rule law, whereby suspects 
would be taken into custody and tried in the courts. This could eliminate the potential for 
future extra-judicial actions on the part of the Indonesian security apparatuses. This step 
would therefore be enormously valuable, since the most chronic grievances and 
resentments of West Papuans are often related to incidents of human-rights violations. 
b. Establish a Human Rights Court and a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
 Finally, this thesis recommends the establishment of a Human Rights 
Court and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Indeed, both institutions are 
mandated by the special autonomy law. Therefore, this research recommends that the 
government fulfill its mandate and enact the policies necessary for establishing these two 
institutions. Failure to do so only exacerbates the human-rights situation in West Papua, 
which is already referred to as a typical example of the Indonesian government’s 
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